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INTRODUCTION

Where this free-floating creation of "reasonable" exceptions to the warrant requirement will end, now that the Court has departed from the balancing approach that
has long been part of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is unclear. But by
allowing a person to be subjected to a warrantless search in his home without his
consent and without exigency, the majority has taken away some of the liberty that
1
the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.

Ninety-three years ago, in response to a newspaper account, Mark2
Twain wrote: "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated."
While it may be premature to sound the death knell for the fourth
is
amendment, it is no exaggeration to suggest that unless drastic action
3
it
amendment,
fourth
the
of
erosion
destructive
the
taken to remedy
may as well be buried.
Current search and seizure doctrine is inconsistent and incoherent.'
No one, including the police who are to abide by it, judges who apply it,
or the people who are protected by it, has any meaningful sense of what
1. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2806-07 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. Cable from London to Associated Press, 1897.
3. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2793 (actual consent was nonexistent and the United
States Supreme Court expanded the consent exception to the warrant requirement to include apparent consent); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (the Court applied Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), to allow protective sweeps in a home in which an arrest was made). For a discussion
of Buie, see infra note 38. See generally Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the
Rehnquist Court, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 825 (1989); Note, Murray v. United States: The Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause, 10 PACE L. REV. 167 (1990); Recent Development, Florida v. Riley: The Emerging Standardfor Aerial Surveillance of the Curtilage,43 VA^D.
L. Rsv. 275 (1990).
4. Over the past two decades scholars have documented the seriousness of this problem. See,
e.g., Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L: REV. 1468 (1985); Weinreb,
Generalitiesof the FourthAmendment, 42 U. CHi.L. REV. 47, 49 (1974) (asserting that a review of
16 major fourth amendment opinions issued between the 1968 and 1972 Terms reveals that the
"body of [fourth amendment] doctrine ... is unstable and unconvincing"). Professor Craig Bradley discovered that the Court decided 35 fourth amendment cases between 1979 and 1984. Bradley
concluded: "In seven of these [cases] there was no majority opinion. In ... seventeen cases decided [between 1983 and 1985], the Supreme Court has never reached the same result as all lower
courts and has usually reversed the highest court below, rendering a total of sixty-one separate
opinions in the process." Bradley, supra, at 1468.
Between 1985 and 1990, the Court rendered 43 opinions. Of the 34 opinions that were decided
in the government's favor, 29 were reversals of the highest court below. Thus, 85.3% of the time,
the lower court unsuccessfully struggled to understand inconsistent developments in fourth
amendment jurisprudence.
Finally, a review of cases before the Court in 1959, 1969, 1979, and 1989 reveals an interesting
statistical pattern. In 1959 the Court ruled for the government in 60% of all cases. In 1969 the
Court ruled for the government in only 25% of all cases. In 1979 the Court ruled for the government in 59.9% of all cases. Finally, in 1989 the Court ruled for the government in 82% of all cases.
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the law is. Undaunted by the lack of coherent guidelines, the police are
searching houses,5 greenhouses, e warehouses,7 motor vehicles," papers, 9
and effects, 10 and seizing persons1 and things. 2 Meanwhile, judges are
required to determine the constitutionality of these searches.
Two decades of jurisprudence covering the warrant requirement
and probable cause have seen a ruling majority of the United States
Supreme Court either refusing to follow precedent or rewriting precedent to suit present concerns. 13 Rather than mold a body of reliable
fourth amendment law, the Supreme Court has created a makeshift solution. Instead of providing direction and guidance to lower courts, the
Court has rendered amorphous case-by-case, fact-specific adjudications, 4 whose method of reasoning often is better suited for juries in
negligence actions than judges adjudicating constitutional rights. This
lack of clear rules has left search and seizure law mired in confusion
and contradiction.

15

5. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478
(1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
9. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985).

10. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109 (1984); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983).
13. Just this Term in Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2793, for example, the majority held that
regardless of whether a third party has actual authority to consent to a search, the consent is legal
if the police reasonably believe that the third party had authority to consent. The majority relied
in part on statements in prior cases which suggested that some room must be allowed for reasonable police mistakes. See id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall points out that
the majority fails to admit that the cases they relied on all dealt with situations in which the
factual error concerned a probable cause determination, not the adequacy of consent for the
searches. Id. at 2805-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall angrily denounces the majority's tampering with precedent:
The majority's glib assertion that "[i]t would be superfluous to multiply" its citations to cases
like Brinegar [v. United States], Hill [v. California]and [Maryland v.] Garrison ... is thus
correct, but for a reason entirely different than the majority suggests. Those cases provide no
illumination of the issue raised in this case, and further citation to like cases would be as
superfluous as the discussion on which the majority's conclusion presently depends.
Id. at 2806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
14. Professor Bradley has suggested that the Court's dilemma stems from its "clear ruleflexible response" ambivalence. He asserts that "the Court tries on the one hand to lay down clear
rules for the police to follow in every situation while also trying to respond flexibly, or 'reasonably,'
to each case because a hard-line approach would lead to exclusion of evidence." Bradley, supra
note 4, at 1470.
15. See id. at 1468-81. Because the Court has failed to provide clear guidelines, it has become
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Some scholars suggest that the fourth amendment is a diseased
limb on a sick tree and that the morass of the fourth amendment is
symbolic of larger problems with constitutional theory generally."'
While the analogy is apt, the fourth amendment branch can be treated,
pruned, and cured apart from the ailments of the rest of the constitu17
tional tree.
The manifestation of the diseased limb is twofold: (1) the Court
has whittled away the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement,
shifting it from a rule-based test to a "common sense, fair-probability"
standard; 18 and (2) the Court has sacrificed the fourth amendment's
prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures for a chameleonlike "reasonableness" approach. 9 The result is almost no reliable substantive law applying the warrant clause."0
The post-Illinois v. Gates2 ' standard for probable cause essentially
transformed the warrant application procedure into a reasonableness
impossible to anticipate future rules.
16. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, The Fourth Amendment As Constitutional Theory, 77
GEo. L.J. 19, 19-22 (1988). The authors note that the recent difficulty in dealing with fourth
amendment problems corresponds with the current controversy surrounding techniques of constitutional adjudication. They characterize the fourth amendment as a diseased limb on the body of
an ailing patient-constitutional theory. Id. at 21-22.
17. If the Court were to accept the suggestions proposed in this Article for the even application of a straightforward rule, its acceptance of the underlying rationale for clarifying the fourth
amendment might spur the Court to use a similar rationale in other areas of constitutional law.
18. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-41 (1983) (holding that probable cause is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances).
19. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987), the Court applied a "special needs" rationale to dispense with the warrant and probable
cause requirements in certain circumstances. The Court instead used a "reasonableness test" to
determine whether the searches were constitutional. See Ortega, 480 U.S. at 719-26; T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 337-43. The reasonableness test also is called a "balancing test." The Court employs this
reasonableness test when it concludes that the government's interests outweigh an individual's
fourth amendment right to privacy. In T.L.O., and to a lesser degree in Ortega, the Court gave
considerable attention to the presence of an individualized suspicion to search the persons and
their belongings. See Ortega, 480 U.S. at 726; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342-47 & n.8.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the Court changed its emphasis and held that
individualized suspicion is not necessary when a search or seizure is governed by the reasonableness analysis. Just this Term, in Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2793, the Court amended the reasonableness analysis even further by suggesting that reasonableness is whatever an officer thinks is
reasonable. See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text.
20. For example, the Court announced recently that one of the traditional exceptions to the
warrant clause-the plain view exception-does not mean what almost everyone thought it meant.
In Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990), the Court held that inadvertence was not a requirement for the plain view exception. The Court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that a majority
of the Court in the plurality opinion of Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), did not mandate
inadvertence. Instead, the Court in Horton held that although inadvertence is a characteristic of
many plain view seizures, it is not a requirement. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309-10.
21. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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evaluation. Because Gates tells us that probable cause is a "practical,
non-technical conception, ' '22 a magistrate approving a warrant affidavit

need look no further than a police officer's reasonable belief that a
search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing. The following year, United
States v. Leon2 3 furthered the breakdown in the probable cause standard when the Court held that regardless of whether a warrant is valid,
the fruits of a search conducted pursuant to a facially valid warrant will
be admitted upon a finding of "good faith" on the part of the executing
officer.24 Thus, Gates made it easier to get a warrant, and Leon made
the fruits of almost every invalid warrant admissible.25 Ironically, both
the Gates and Leon decisions affirmed a preference for warrants,26 yet
their relaxed probable cause standard began the shift away from traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence toward a reasonableness
standard.
Although the fourth amendment conveys to "the People [the right]
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, '27 the reasonableness approach focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights
of the people. The question, then, becomes whether the police acted
reasonably rather than whether a person's rights were violated. This approach endorses retrospective evaluations of police behavior rather than
prospective protections. It is a test with no objective rules-a method of
procedure subject to the values of the individual police officer and the
22. Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
23. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
24. See id. at 922-25.
25. Exceptions do exist to the "good faith" exception announced in Leon: (1) if a magistrate
is not neutral and detached; (2) if an affidavit in support of the warrant is knowingly and recklessly false; or (3) if the affidavit clearly lacked probable cause. Id. at 914-17. These exceptions,
however, are rare and almost impossible to prove. As a practical matter, almost all warrant-based
searches will meet the good faith test. Thus, the fruits of those searches will be admissible regardless of whether the warrant is defective.
26. In Gates Justice William Rehnquist wrote:
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly
reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring "the individual
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need
to search, and the limits of his power to search."
462 U.S. at 236 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). Similarly, Justice Byron
White in Leon wrote:
Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a
more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,' we have
expressed a strong preference for warrants. .. ."
468 U.S. at 913-14 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948))).
27. The fourth amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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reviewing judge.
The evisceration of the warrant requirement and its accompanying
erosion of fourth amendment protections derive from judicial dislike of
the exclusionary rule.2 8 Since the application of the exclusionary rule to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio,29 the Supreme Court has struggled to balance the protections of the fourth amendment against the loss of incriminating evidence and conviction of the guilty. The ongoing battle
with the exclusionary rule is apparent in five significant developments
in fourth amendment law: (1) a narrowed definition of what constitutes
a search;30 (2) standing thresholds; sl (3) the denial of federal habeas
corpus review of fourth amendment violations;32 (4) the expansion of
exceptions to the warrant requirement; 3 and (5) a free-form reasona28. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Powell the Court reasoned:
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review are well
known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from
the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal
proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and
often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant ....
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.
Id. at 489-90 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Bradley, Criminal Procedurein the Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273, 285 (1987) (noting Chief Justice
Rehnquist's tendency to find that the evidence in question was not seized illegally). Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the exclusionary rule "imposes a burden out of all proportion to the Fourth
Amendment values which it seeks to advance." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist belies that whatever the remedy may be for
illegally obtained evidence, it should be neither suppression of evidence nor reversal of convictions
for failure to suppress. Bradley, supra, at 285; see also California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 926-28
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (holding that a chemical test
which discloses only whether a substance is cocaine does not compromise a "legitimate" expectation of privacy and is not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that a
"sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search). See generally infra subpart
II(B)(1).
31. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (conferring standing only upon proof
of a violation of an individual's own fourth amendment rights); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980) (holding that one must have a "legitimate" expectation of privacy in the area searched to
raise a fourth amendment challenge). See generally infra subpart II(B)(2).
32. Powell, 428 U.S. at 465 (holding that if a state proceeding provided a fair forum for
raising the claims, federal habeas corpus review is denied). See generally infra subpart II(B)(3).
33. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (holding that fixed sobriety checkpoints
do not violate the fourth amendment); Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990) (ruling that
inadvertence is not required for a seizure of evidence in plain view); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct.
1093 (1990) (holding that incident to valid arrest police can make a protective sweep throughout
the entire premises if they have a reasonable suspicion of danger or accomplices); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (holding that the search of a foreign national's home is
not protected by the fourth amendment); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (special needs exception); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (ruling that
inventory searches pursuant to standardized procedures can be performed without a warrant);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that under the automobile exception, officers
with probable cause to search a car can search the entire car and all the containers in it); Almeida-
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bleness analysis. 34 The desire to preserve evidence even if it was obtained questionably has reduced the fourth amendment's protection of
individual rights and confounds any attempt to apply the dictates of
the fourth amendment in a coherent fashion.
Under present law, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the search falls into an exception.3 5 This requirement, however, has
become an unworkable standard. Rather than enforce the per se test
and suppress damning evidence, the Court has circumvented the warrant requirement by shifting the inquiry to the reasonableness of the
search or seizure 6 or simply creating new exceptions for new situaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (suggesting that warrantless searches of persons and
their effects may be made upon crossing the international border); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (finding consent searches valid without a warrant); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view doctrine); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(holding that hot pursuit is a true exigent circumstance justifying the entrance of a dwelling without a warrant when police have probable cause to believe evidence may be lost or destroyed);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (requiring that fruits of an illegal
search must be suppressed unless they are discovered from an independent source). See generally
infra subpart II(B)(4).
34. See infra subpart II(B)(5).
35. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
36. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1990). In Skinner the
Court upheld a drug testing policy that subjected all railway employees to mandatory drug testing
after a railway accident occurred. The Court dispensed with the warrant and probable cause requirement and held that these searches should be judged by the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard because the "special needs" of the government in this situation were greater than those
in ordinary law enforcement. Id. at 619-21. To determine whether a search was reasonable, the
appropriate test balances the private individual's fourth amendment interests against the need to
promote legitimate government interests. The Court concluded that the government interest in
promoting safety on the railways outweighed any individual interest, and therefore, the drug testing policy was not an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 633.
Furthermore, the Court held that no individual suspicion was necessary to validate the search.
Id. at 624. Previously, when the reasonableness analysis was applied, the party conducting the
search needed individualized suspicion to conduct a constitutional search of a particular individual. Skinner eliminated this requirement in favor of reasonableness. The Court balanced the same
two competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the search and concluded that the
government interest outweighed the need for individualized suspicion. Id. at 633. Moreover, it
found that these suspicionless searches were reasonable. Id. at 634; see also National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1990). The Court decided Von Raab on the same day
as Skinner. Von Raab also posed the same issue. In a close decision, the Court approved a United
States Customs Service drug program that provided for suspicionless drug testing of incumbent
employees seeking transfer or promotion to a position "directly involving the interdiction of illegal
drugs, or to positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm." Id. at at 679. The policy's
objective was to safeguard the interests of the national borders and to prevent illegal drugs from
entering the country. See id. at 666. The Court again found that the special needs of the government justified dispensing with the warrant, probable cause, and individualized suspicion requirements in favor of the reasonableness test used in Skinner. Id. at 666, 679. The Court concluded
that the government interests outweighed any individual interests, and therefore, the drug tests
were reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at 679; see also infra subpart II(B)(5) (discuss-
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tions8 7 This improvisation changes with each new case.38 While this ap-

proach has provided an outlet for judicial creativity, it is a poor
jurisprudential model.
The time for choice in fourth amendment jurisprudence is overdue.
The options are clear: redefine the warrant requirement to make it
workable within a framework faithful to the precepts of its drafting and
sensitive to the realities of a limited criminal justice system dealing
with modern criminal ingenuity, or totally dispense with the charade
and eliminate the need for warrants or probable cause as a prerequisite
ing the reasonableness test).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (holding that the
warrantless search of a foreign national's home does not violate the Constitution because a home
outside the United States is not an interest protected by the fourth amendment); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding that the warrantless search of an opaque garbage bag does
not violate the fourth amendment because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
garbage); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (ruling that when an officer relies in good
faith on the validity of a judicial search warrant that later turns out to be invalid, the evidence
obtained through the search need not be suppressed); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
(holding that the installation of a beeper which allows police to follow a suspect raises no fourth
amendment issue); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (finding that the warrantless search
of a container within a car does not violate the fourth amendment if police had probable cause to
search the whole car).
38. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel police with an arrest warrant went to
the defendant's house. Upon arresting the defendant inside the house, they searched the entire
premises. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54. The Court held that it is reasonable to search the person and
any area within the person's immediate control or reach to prevent destruction of evidence or to
protect the officer's safety. Id. at 762-63. Any evidence found in this search may be seized. Any
search outside of this scope, such as other rooms in the house, however, must be made pursuant to
a valid search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. Id. at 763. If no warrant is
obtained, the evidence is inadmissible as a violation of the fourth amendment. Id.
In Belton a police officer stopped the respondent's automobile for speeding. Belton, 453 U.S.
at 455. While at the car window, the officer smelled marijuana and saw an envelope in plain view
that he suspected contained marijuana. Id. at 455-56. The officer arrested the respondent, searched
the entire passenger compartment of the car, and found cocaine. Id. at 456. The Court held that
this warrantless search incident to a valid arrest was reasonable. Id. at 462-63. To reach this conclusion, the Court extended Chimel to allow a warrantless search of the entire passenger compartment of a car, including the glove compartment and any closed containers, when a person is
arrested in the car. Id. at 460-61.
In Buie the Court applied Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to permit protective sweeps
throughout a dwelling incident to a valid arrest. Police went to the respondent's house with an
arrest warrant. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1095. Upon entering, they split up and walked throughout the
house. Buie was found, arrested, and taken inside the house. Id. An officer, however, returned to
the basement of Buie's home and seized evidence in plain view that the state used to convict him.
Id. The Court held that when an officer has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that
other suspects may be in the house, or that the officers may be in danger, a limited protective
sweep without a search warrant can be made incident to a valid arrest. Id. at 1098-99. The Court
emphasized that it only authorized a cursory search of places where persons reasonably may be
found. Id. at 1099. Furthermore, the sweep may be made only to search for persons, but other
evidence found in plain view may be seized. Id. Therefore, Buie extends Chimel to allow a cursory
search of the area outside the immediate control of the arrestee.
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of a search or seizure.
This Article begins with the premise that warrants safeguard
meaningful rights and are essential to the essence of the fourth amendment. The Article asserts that the warrant clause must be revitalized
and enforced, but in a manner that makes it more compatible with law
enforcement realities. A less rigid, but more rigidly applied, test must
replace the per se unreasonable test. Warrantless searches should be
deemed presumptively unreasonable, and the government should bear
the burden of overcoming the presumption. 9 At the same time, police
should be able to obtain warrants more easily, and they should face
serious disciplinary measures when proceeding without one.
Part II of this Article discusses the breakdown of fourth amendment law and why the Court needs to develop a new standard. Part HI
defines the proposed standard and provides some examples of how it
would work in practice. Part IV highlights the benefits of the presumptively unreasonable standard generally.
II. THE SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY
Translating the abstract prohibition in the fourth amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable guidelines is a
difficult task that has divided the Court deeply.40 Although the Court
occasionally mentions the benefit of "bright line" tests, it overwhelmingly opts for a less-defined approach and often blurs or obliterates
whatever lines exist. 41 The warrant requirement, for example, once was

based on a straightforward test: warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except in a few well-defined circumstances. 42 The per se test,

however, proved unacceptable for a Court unwilling to exclude evidence
pursuant to a narrow rule. Today, the warrant requirement is notable
more for its exceptions than its enforcement. 43 This breakdown of the
39. See infra Part H.
40. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
41. See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 454 (discussed supra note 38). Belton established a bright
line test to determine when the police can make a warrantless search of the entire passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle. See id. at 458-61. The majority determined that fourth amendment protection could best be realized if the police have a definite rule to follow when conducting
a vehicle search incident to arrest of the occupants. The Court determined that a single familiar
standard was essential to guide police conduct. Id. at 458. But see Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1093 (discussed supra note 38); Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989) (ruling that the Mirandawarning need not be given exactly as described in the Miranda opinion and that as long as the
defendant is appraised of his rights accurately and fully, Miranda is not violated). See generally
Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When FourthAmendment
Activity Begins, 79 J. CPnm. L. & CRMINOLOGY 437 (1988).

42. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
43. There are no fewer than 12 (and perhaps more than 15) exceptions to the warrant requirement. See infra subpart H(B)(4).
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can be traced directly to the development of the

The Role of the Exclusionary Rule

Between 1961 and 1990 the Court decided 230 search and seizure
cases. The underlying issue in every one of these cases was whether
damning evidence should be suppressed because of a fourth amendment
illegality. In rendering its many opinions on the validity of a search or
seizure, the Court was aware that the result of its decision would determine the admission of evidence.
A federal rule excluding evidence obtained during a warrantless
search has xisted unchallenged since 1914.' Although there was a
great uproar by conservative critics when the Warren Court decided
Mapp v. Ohio,," the most radical act the Court accomplished was to
apply a preexisting principle to the states. 47 Furthermore, the social upheaval and increased criminal violence predicted by detractors of the
exclusionary rule never occurred.48 Nonetheless, the exclusionary rule
44. When the term "warrant requirement" is used herein, it refers to both the probable cause
and particularity requirements. They are not defined separately because they are inherent in the
warrant requirement.
45. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
46. See, e.g., Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora'sProblems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L.
Rav. 4 (1962) (asserting that Mapp has affected adversely the ability of the police to obtain evidence); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319 (arguing that the
lack of uniformity between federal and local rules leads to inconsistent application); Wolf, A Survey of the Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 193 (1963) (asserting that the
exclusionary rule has created more problems than it has solved).
47. In fact, much of the Warren Court's "activism" was not nearly as radical as the Court's
detractors have asserted. Many of the Court's most controversial decisions simply advanced the
application of preexisting doctrines to the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (right to jury trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule).
48. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1964); Taft,
Protecting the Public from Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.BA J. 815
(1964). The empirical data about the impact and efficacy of the exclusionary rule is varied and
ambiguous, at best. A Cincinnati study of arrests and convictions for narcotics and weapons offenses reveals that the Mapp decision had no impact. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure 37 U. CH. L. REv. 665, 690 (1970). While arrests and convictions for gambling
offenses decreased after Mapp, they were on the decline for the two years preceding Mapp. Id. at
690-91. A study of the disposition of misdemeanor narcotics cases in New York for the six months
preceding and following Mapp reveals that there was little change in disposition patterns after
Mapp. Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-SeizurePractices in Narcotics
Cases, 4 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 87, 103 (1968). For additional statistics on various aspects of

the impact of the exclusionary rule, see Canon, Is the ExclusionaryRule in FailingHealth? Some
New Data and a Plea Against a PrecipitousConclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974).
It is not unusual that the expected increase in crime never occurred after the Court approved
a state exclusionary rule. Intuitively it makes sense that the exclusionary rule is more likely to
deter police than to entice criminals to commit more crimes. Most criminals usually do not antici-
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remains a thorn in the side of the present Supreme Court, perhaps
more because the rule is invoked only by "guilty" people to avoid conviction rather than because it acts as an incentive for innocent people
to commit crimes.
This turmoil began in 1914 in the landmark opinion of Weeks v.
United States. 9 In prohibiting the use of the fruits of the warrantless
searches of Mr. Weeks's home, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
purpose of the fourth amendment is to limit the exercise of power by
the United States courts and federal officials and to protect the citizens
of the United States against unreasonable searches and seizures of their
persons, houses, papers, and effects. 5 0 The Court held that papers or

effects taken from a house without a warrant were illegally seized documents that must be returned to the defendant and could not be used
against him at trial. The Court further stated that if letters and private
documents could be seized illegally and used as evidence against a defendant, then the protection of the fourth amendment would be meaningless and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution.

51

Thus,

although the fourth amendment does not mention anything about excluding evidence illegally seized, the Court recognized that an exclusionary rule was a necessary remedy5 2 for the violation of a
53
constitutional right.

pate being caught. It is even less likely that they contemplate what evidence will be used against
them at trial.
49. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
50.

Id. at 391-92.

51. Id. at 393. Seven years later in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), the Court
firmly secured the exclusionary rule when it broadly held that evidence seized through an illegal
search or seizure conducted by federal authorities could not be introduced in a federal prosecution.
52. Justice John Clark likely would take issue with the characterization of the exclusionary
rule as a remedy instead of as an essential part of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. See
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he [fourth] Amendment plainly operates to disable the government from gathering information and securing evidence in certain ways ....
Understood in this way, the Amendment
directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will be lost to the government; therefore, it is not the exclusionary rule, but the Amendment itself that has imposed
this cost.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes
omitted); see also Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "EmpiricalProposition"?,16 CREGHTON L. REv. 565, 590-97 (1983) (noting that nowhere in Weeks is the exclusionary rule called a "remedy").
53. A right without a remedy is little more than an empty platitude. While there is great
controversy over the appropriateness of excluding evidence from the guilt phase of trial as a remedy for police overzealousness, this Article will not discuss the utility of the exclusionary rule as an
appropriate remedy for violation of a constitutional right. Moreover, because the exclusionary rule
has withstood both harsh criticism and the test of time, it remains, at least in theory, the remedy
for fourth amendment violations. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 411-29 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (listing proposals for eliminating the exclusionary

rule).
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Thirty-five years went by before the Court again addressed the exclusionary rule. In Wolf v. Colorado 4 the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the states.5 Until the Court overruled Wolf in
Mapp,56 search and seizure cases focused on developing and refining the
substance of fourth amendment doctrine in relatively straightforward
fashion. 57 After Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to the states, the
54. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
55. Id. at 33. Although Justice Felix Frankfurter affirmed that the core of the fourth amendment is "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police," id. at 27, and
that the right of privacy protected by the fourth amendment is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty,'" id., he concluded that an exclusionary rule lacked the appropriate authority to legitimize
the rule as the only means for enforcing the fourth amendment. Justice Frankfurter stated:
"[Weeks] was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not
based on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The
decision was a matter of judicial implication." Id. at 28.
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. After Weeks and before Mapp, major doctrinal changes were rare. Most of these doctrines, however, are still in effect today. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920) (holding that all fruits of an unconstitutional search are inadmissible unless they are
derived from an independent source). Some of the major doctrinal decisions gave birth to a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, some of which still are recognized today. See, e.g.,
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (granting standing to invoke fourth amendment protection to a defendant who is legitimately on the premises of the place searched); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (holding that a defendant's direct testimony may be impeached on
cross-examination by the use of evidence derived from an unconstitutional search and seizure);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (finding that a warrantless entry and search of a
home is justified only if exigent circumstances exist); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)
(allowing the voluntary waiver of fourth amendment rights); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944) (holding that to assert the fourth amendment privilege, the things seized must be the private property, or at least in the possession, of the claimant); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S.
114 (1942) (stating that only the victim of an unconstitutional search has standing to object to use
of the seized evidence); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (finding that wiretapping a
phone conversation and other nontrespassory detection techniques are not forbidden for fourth
amendment purposes); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (stating that it was well recognized that officers, incident to a valid arrest, could make a warrantless search of the person and the
place where the person was arrested if the crime was committed in that place, but that a warrant
was necessary to search other places); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that
with probable cause, officers may search an automobile without a warrant because of the inherent
mobility of a car and the possibility of losing evidence); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)
(finding that the fourth amendment does not protect "open fields").
After these exceptions were created, the Court interpreted them in several subsequent cases.
See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (balancing the interests of the individual
versus the interests of government and deciding that a search of a house without a warrant or
exigent circumstances was unreasonable); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (finding
a search unconstitutional when police pushed a microphone through the defendant's wall thereby
touching a heating duct and committing a trespass); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)
(allowing the police to search a hotel room after the occupant has checked out and seize items left
behind with the consent of management); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (holding that
without probable cause, the police cannot search a car); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958)
(holding that probable cause alone does not justify a warrantless entry into a dwelling); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (ruling that a search made incident to an invalid
arrest is unconstitutional); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (finding that an under-
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law of search and seizure started its downward spiral of unpredictabilcover agent who obtains incriminating statements while wearing a wired microphone in the defendant's place of business does not constitute a fourth amendment violation); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48 (1951) (holding that a warrantless search of a hotel room is unconstitutional even when
probable cause exists if the search is not incident to an arrest or without exigent circumstances
justifying entry); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (allowing a search incident to an
arrest of a one-room office because it was in the "immediate control" of the arrestee). Rabinowitz
is the first time the Court mentioned that searches are governed by reasonableness, not a warrant.
See also Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (requiring a search warrant whenever
practicable); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (extending the automobile exception only
to circumstances in which there is probable cause that Prohibition laws are being violated); Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (finding that under the appropriate circumstances, a search
incident to an arrest may extend beyond the person to include the premises under the arrestee's
immediate control); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (finding that listening to a
conversation from another room is not a fourth amendment violation).
Many decisions dealt with the issue resolved in Mapp: the application of the exclusionary rule
to the states. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (holding that a statute
requiring a search warrant for a building inspection is constitutional); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960) (holding that evidence obtained by state officials is inadmissible at federal trial
over a defendant's timely objection if it is the product of an unreasonable search even when no
federal officials participated in the search and seizure); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954)
(upholding a state statute authorizing warrantless searches for certain gambling misdemeanors);
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (deciding that any participation of a federal officer in
an unreasonable state or private search is unconstitutional); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S.
487 (1944) (holding that evidence found in an unreasonable search by state officials is admissible
at federal trial).
Several cases concern probable cause and the fourth amendment's particularity requirement.
See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (allowing the use of an informant's hearsay
information to formulate probable cause); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (holding
that probable cause exists when trustworthy facts and circumstances are within an officer's personal knowledge); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (ruling that mere suspicion or
belief is not enough for probable cause); Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932) (holding that a
warrant cannot be based on the same factors that justified an expired warrant because probable
cause must be related in time to the warrant); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) (requiring that an affiant state independent facts for each warrant and finding that the mere belief in the
truth of statements made in a different warrant is insufficient); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1
(1931) (finding that the presence of odor alone does not give probable cause); Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (holding that legal evidence is not necessary to show probable cause
and that a reasonable and prudent officer's personal appraisal of facts which justify the belief that
evidence will be found is enough); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (prohibiting general searches through the particularity requirement); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927)
(holding insufficient a warrant which states that the officer has "good reason to believe and does
believe" rather than that the officer has probable cause); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5
(1927) (finding that information sworn before a state official without authority to conduct federal
proceedings violates the fourth amendment because it is not "supported by oath or affirmation");
Steele No. 1 v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (holding that the particularity requirement is
satisfied if the officer with the search warrant, with reasonable effort, can ascertain and identify
the place to be searched and the things to be seized).
The remainder of the cases decided between Weeks and Mapp dealt with miscellaneous
fourth amendment issues that helped shape current doctrine. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959) (finding constitutional a statute allowing a search for administrative purposes, but not for
evidence of criminal activity); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (finding that police activity
shocked the conscience of the court and, therefore, violated the defendant's right to due process);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (holding that public property held by a private citizen
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ity. Indeed, Mapp was the catalyst for an explosion of state criminal
procedure cases that continues to the present.

The problem with Mapp, its progeny, and the current disharmony,58 is that the creation of an exclusionary remedy shifted fourth
amendment law from text-based analysis to procedural rules, which
often are a reaction to individual factual circumstances rather than
guidelines for social justice.8 9 When the Court read into the fourth
amendment a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure that does
not appear in the words of the brief, vague, and unilluminating text,"0
the Court unwittingly began the process of reading out the warrant and
probable cause requirements that do appear in the text. Accordingly,
Weeks and Mapp both expanded and limited the fourth amendment.
After Mapp, the words "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized,""' commonly called the warrant clause of the fourth amendment, generated an enormous volume of litigation. The Constitution
does not proscribe all searches without warrants, only "unreasonable
searches and seizures. ' ' e 2 The exclusionary rule, however, requires the
is subject to recall and inspection at any reasonable time); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932) (holding that a general search for evidence, where no evidence of a crime is suspected, is
unreasonable); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (liberally construing
the fourth amendment in favor of those whom it was intended to protect); Segurola v. United
States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927) (requiring that an objection to illegal evidence must be timely made);
McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927) (ruling that destruction of property does not render
evidence found pursuant to a lawful arrest inadmissible even though officers may be civilly liable);
Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) (holding that the compulsory production of corporate documents to a grand jury made pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum is not a fourth amendment violation); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (deciding that searches by private,
nongovernmental persons are not prohibited by the fourth amendment); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921) (holding that searches and seizures achieved through deception, as well as
those forced or coerced, may be unreasonable).
58. Justice Frankfurter wrote some years back that "[t]he course of true law pertaining to
searches and seizures ... has not ... run smooth[ly]." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,

618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Ten years later Justice Potter Stewart reiterated that it
has not yet been possible to reduce "Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971).
59. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 436 (1980) (suggesting that the Burger Court
used the criminal justice system to advance the substantive aim of crime prevention, but that the
rights of criminal defendants were sacrificed in the advancement of these broader social goals).
60. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mnfr4. L. Rav. 349, 353-54
(1974). The fourth amendment enunciates: "the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches ... and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause." US. CONST. amend. IV.
But the amendment does not define what activities amount to searches and seizures, or what
makes activities unreasonable, or what is probable cause.
61.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

62. See supra note 27. The view that only "unreasonable" searches and seizures are prohib-
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fruits of a warrantless search or seizure, or of an invalid warrant, s to be
excluded from all criminal prosecutions-and, thus, we have the great
controversy over the so-called warrant clause. In the words of Justice
William Rehnquist, "[E]ach time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment
rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and
the search for truth is deflected." 4 This visceral repugnance toward
"benefitting" the guilty has caused disharmony within the Court and
has created ever increasing layers of conflicting doctrine.
In the years immediately following Mapp, the Warren Court fashioned a variety of procedural rules designed to provide greater protection to the accused while also accomplishing greater social goals.65 The
Court began a tripartite mission of encouraging respect for individual
rights, 6 mandating strict judicial scrutiny of the law enforcement process, 6 7 and creating a set of rules that police could accept and abide
by. 8 Justice Warren Burger then charted a new course for the Court.
During his leadership the Court shifted the emphasis from protecting
individual rights to controlling crime. Thus, it no longer was politic to
ited first was articulated in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-66 (1950). The notion
surfaced occasionally in a few later opinions, particularly those written by Justice Byron White
and now by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056
(1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J.); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 289 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
63. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
64. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
65. Just as the Burger and Rehnquist Courts that followed, the Warren Court used the criminal justice system as a tool for social engineering. Perhaps the clearest example of the Warren
Court's activism was its decision in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643, to overrule Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949), and enforce the exclusionary rule against the states. This position neither was briefed
nor argued by the petitioner's counsel.
In Mapp Dollree Mapp was convicted in Ohio State Court for possession of obscene materials.
The materials used to convict Mapp were seized from her home in a warrantless raid. Mapp, 367
U.S. at 644-45. In the United States Supreme Court, Mapp's counsel pursued the question of
whether one could be convicted constitutionally for the mere knowing possession of obscene materials.
The only mention of Wolf appeared in the last paragraph of the amicus brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union, which urged overruling Wolf. 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(e), at 14 (2d ed. 1987).

66. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
67. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
68. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
69. See C. WHrrEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND
CONcmrs 3-4 (2d ed. 1986). Professor Louis Seidman suggests that the Burger Court never quite
fulfilled its mission of convicting the guilty in the name of crime control. Just as the Warren Court
that preceded it, the Burger Court's commitment to its model was "only rhetoric deep." Seidman,

supra note 59, at 445. As Seidman states: "Far from establishing a process focusing on individualized guilt and innocence, the Burger Court has continued to sacrifice the truth in individual cases
on the altar of broader social goals." Id. at 445-46.
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let the criminal "go free because the constable has blundered." ' The
new challenge focused on convicting the criminal regardless of whether
the constable blundered. Today's Court, guided by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, advances the Burger Court model further by "getting"
the criminal and simultaneously often defending the constable's
judgment."1
Meanwhile, the fourth amendment has blown like a leaf among
these shifting winds of social policy, lost first in the development, and
now the breakdown, of procedural rules. Because the exclusionary rule
has caused so much dissent and confusion, the simple answer would be
to overrule Mapp v. Ohio. Certainly this has occurred to the Court, but
it will not happen simply because a majority of the Court would not
support such a reversal. Alternatively, the Court may have refrained
from overruling Mapp because politically it might be easier to suffocate
the fourth amendment slowly rather than shoot it down in cold blood. 2
IB. Five-PartDisharmony
Twenty-nine years after Mapp, the warrant requirement has been
eviscerated, and fourth amendment jurisprudence is a mass of confusion that clouds and often eliminates fourth amendment protections.
Five separate but overlapping developments in search and seizure doctrine have nourished this confusion: (1) a narrowed interpretation of
the meaning of search within the context of the fourth amendment; (2)
restructured standing requirements for criminal defendants; (3) the
elimination of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for fourth amendment
violations; (4) the "shifting maze of categorical boxes"' that makes up
the exceptions to the warrant requirement; and (5) a sliding-scale reasonableness approach to the fourth amendment. This Article examines
each of these developments in turn.
70. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
657 (1926).
71. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093
(1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
72. Justice Brennan, who views the exclusionary rule as an integral part of the fourth amendment, charged in a vitriolic dissent in United States v. Leon that the Court killed the fourth
amendment by endorsing a good faith exception to the warrant requirement. Brennan stated: "I
have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the [exclusionary] rule. It now
appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete." Leon, 468 U.S. at 92829 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
73. See Uviller, Reasonabilityand the Fourth Amendment: A (Belated) Farewell to Justice
Potter Stewart, 25 CRIM.L. BULL. 29, 33 (1989).
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1. Definitional Limitations
The warrant and reasonableness clauses of the fourth amendment
are triggered only when a state actor executes a search or seizure. Interpretation of these terms, therefore, is a critical threshold question.
When fewer activities qualify as a search or seizure, fourth amendment
protections hold less significance. In recent years the Court has narrowed significantly the definitions of these terms.
Prior to Katz v. United States,7 decided in 1967, a search required
a physical intrusion into a protected area-a person, house, paper, or
effect-to qualify for fourth amendment scrutiny."5 With technology
enabling intrusion without trespassing, the Court abandoned this analysis in Katz. The Court explained that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,"7 and thus, the Court established a test that tied
the question of search to notions of privacy. Justice Potter Stewart,
writing for the majority, stated: "[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. .

.

. But what he seeks to preserve as private,

even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."'77 This definition focuses on the individual and the steps taken

to shield an activity from the public eye.
Concurring in Katz, Justice John Harlan set out a two-part test
that subsequently became the law: First, a person must exhibit an actual-subjective-expectation of privacy, and second, that expectation
objectively must be one that society recognizes as "reasonable." 7'8 Thus,
a person strongly may believe that activities within the home are protected because they are in the most inviolate of places-the home. But
if one's house is made of unobstructed glass, then the expectation of
privacy will fail the objective criteria of Justice Harlan's test.7 9
74.

389 U.S. 347 (1967)

75. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), the Court held that the protection of the
fourth amendment does not extend to open fields because no trespass occurred onto the curtilage,
a recognized protected area. In United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), the Court found that
shining a flashlight into a boat was not a search because, although the contents of the boat were
exposed, there was no trespass onto a protected interest. Finally, in Ohnstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), the Court held that wiretapping a phone conversation was not forbidden by the
fourth amendment when no physical trespass occurred to obtain the conversations.
76. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
77. Id. at 351-52. The "Katz test" evolved into the two-part subjective-objective expectation
of privacy test enunciated in Justice John Harlan's concurrence. See infra text accompanying note
78. One must focus on the original formulation, however, to discern the true intent of the Katz
Court.
78. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. That police lawfully could search the interior of a glass house without a warrant because
their actions are not in contravention of the fourth amendment raises an interesting dilemma.
Absent exigent circumstances, however, they could not go in the house and seize contraband,
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The Harlan test, like any subjective-objective reasonableness test,
is susceptible to shifting social and political influences. Unless one lives
in isolation, a subjective belief is a product of societal norms. If fewer
instances arise in which a court finds a subjective expectation of privacy
that society (in actuality, a court) is willing to find objectively reasonable, then subjective expectations diminish. Justice Harlan's test, therefore, becomes the ultimate catch-22 and could eliminate all claims to
fourth amendment protection. Taken to its absurd extreme, the government could defeat any subjective expectation of privacy simply by
broadcasting on television every half-hour its intention to place all citizens under comprehensive electronic surveillanceY °
While not quite as obvious as announced surveillance, recent decisions erode fourth amendment protections by placing increasingly
greater emphasis on the objective criteria: the Court focuses on the nature of the intrusion rather than actual subjective expectations of privacy. In United States v. Place,s ' decided in 1983, Drug Enforcement
Administration agents temporarily seized a suspect's luggage to enable
a drug detection dog to sniff it.82 Although the majority found that the
fourth amendment protects a person's "privacy interest in the contents
of personal luggage," they held that a canine sniff is not a search. The
majority reasoned that a "sniff" does not require opening luggage and
rummaging through its contents and, therefore, is less intrusive than a
traditional search. Furthermore, the Court stated that the sniff was less
intrusive because it disclosed only the presence or absence of narcotics,
a contraband item.83 Permitting a minimum level of intrusion before
labeling an act a search, and then tying that level of intrusion to the
nature of the item searched, sends a very different message than Justice
Stewart's majority opinion in Katz. Justice Stewart's test, instead, fofruits, or instrumentalities without a warrant.
In most situations we find that the fourth amendment offers less protection from warrantless
seizures than from warrantless searches. In the public arena, for example, police generally have
much greater leeway to make arrests without a warrant. United States v. Watson, 432 U.S. 411
(1976) (stating the common-law rule that a police officer could arrest without a warrant for a
misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his
presence as long as there is a reasonable ground for making the arrest).
Permitting a warrantless arrest is particularly ironic given that the arrestee who does not
make bail could end up spending 10 to 20 days in jail before a formal determination of probable
cause. Why is it that a greater infringement upon liberty demands less protection than a search of
property?
80. Amsterdam, supra note 60, at 384.
81. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
82. Id. at 698-99. They actually held the luggage for 90 minutes during which they transported it from La Guardia to Kennedy Airport. The Court held that a 90-minute detention exceeded the bounds of the brief detention permitted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for
investigative purposes. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
83. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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cuses on the steps that the individual took to shield the personal effects
from the public eye, not the actual physical intrusion."
The lesser intrusion rationale in Place surfaced more prominently
85
the next year in United States v. Jacobsen.
In Jacobsen Federal Express employees opened a damaged box in which they found a tube
made of silver duct tape. A manager cut open the tube and found
plastic bags containing white powder. The private carrier called the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), but before the DEA arrived
the Federal Express employees returned the plastic bags to the tube
and the box, which was left open. A federal agent saw that one end of
the tube was slit open. He removed the plastic bags containing the
white powder, field tested the powder, and identified it as cocaine. A
second field test confirmed the first. The agents rewrapped the package,
obtained a warrant to search the location to which the package was addressed, and arrested the respondents. 6
The respondents argued that the warrant was invalid because it
was based on a warrantless test of the white powder, which was a significant expansion of the earlier private search by Federal Express. The
Court rejected this argument and found no significant expansion of the
private search because the package was opened already.8 7 The respondents argued that because Federal Express did not field test the substance, the DEA did expand the intrusion. The Court found otherwise,
using rationale very similar to that articulated in Place. The field test
did not violate a societally reasonable expectation of privacy 8 because
it only confirmed one fact of which the DEA agents previously were
unaware-that the substance was cocaine.89 The critical finding, however, was the Court's determination that "[a] chemical test that merely
discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy."9 0
Linking the definition of a search to the legitimacy of the item
searched represents a radical departure from the Katz notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. One can have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in an illegitimate item or act. If, for example, a state made
homosexual sex a crime, persons who engaged in such sex in the privacy
of their bedroom with the shades drawn would have a reasonable expec84. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
85. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
86. Id. at 111-12.
87. Id. at 121.
88. Id. at 122.
89. Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (finding that following "beeper"
signal along a public highway is not a search).
90. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:473

tation of privacy in their act. If, however, a reliable informant revealed
this activity, arguably police could invade the bedroom without a warrant because the individuals had no legitimate expectation of privacy
when engaged in an illegitimate act.9 1
Although the cases have not ventured so far as to allow warrantless
intrusions into the home,"2 the Court has laid groundwork in this direction. In New Jersey v. T.L.O. 5 the Court stated that "the Fourth
Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that are
unreasonable or otherwise 'illegitimate.' ",s The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals used this legitimacy language to justify a finding that drug
smugglers have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the sealed hull
of a boat.95 Although this analysis might have a superficial appeal, it is
nothing more than a self-fulfilling tautology: A search occurs only if an
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched;
society is not prepared to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy
in areas where illicit activity is conducted; therefore, any inspection of
illicit activity cannot be a search. If the white powder tested in Jacobsen was not cocaine, but something similar, such as another drug used
in making a controversial AIDS medicine, would the Court reach the
same conclusion that no search took place?' Taken to its logical ex7
treme, the fourth amendment, therefore, only protects the innocent.
A second line of attack in the post-Katz definitional limitation cru91. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding constitutional a statute making consensual sodomy a criminal act).
92. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (requiring probable cause to justify a
search that precedes a plain view seizure in a residence).
93. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
94. Id. at 338.
95. United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F.2d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating: "We cannot
imagine that society would recognize as reasonable the use of 'dead space' in the hull of a ship,
sealed with permanent material and disguised in appearance, for the legitimate storage of personal
items").
96. What is legitimate? What if the powder that Jacobsen was shipping was legitimate, but
the means of shipping it was a crime? Assume that the powder was a new drug to fight AIDS, that
a federal statute exists which prohibits the interstate shipment of improperly labeled drugs, and
that the white powder was not labeled as a drug. Mr. Jacobsen's activity still
would be illegitimate.
How does one apply the test?'
97. This is a rather interesting turn of events. Essentially this premise is a reversal of the
argument that the exclusionary rule protects only the guilty. Some commentators suggest that the
fourth amendment protects only the innocent. One such author, Professor Arnold Loewy, bases
this conclusion on two propositions: (1) it is not unreasonable for the government to search for and
seize evidence of a crime, and (2) the fourth amendment does not protect the right to secrete
evidence of a crime. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81
MICH. L. Rzv. 1229, 1229 (1983). Professor Loewy bases the first of these assumptions on the text,
history, and decisions concerning the fourth amendment. See id. at 1231-44. He supports the second assumption by analyzing the use of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard. See id.
at 1248-57. Based on these propositions, Loewy concludes that the fourth amendment is designed
to protect only the innocent: a guilty person is merely an incidental beneficiary.
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sade is found in the curtilage and aerial surveillance cases. As in the
Place-Jacobsenchemical analysis limitation, the question of whether a
search took place is tied to the area searched. The focus, however, is on
reasonable police activity rather than the legitimacy of the area or article searched. Traditionally, heightened privacy expectations are associated with the home, giving residents a secure subjective expectation of
privacy."s Recent cases concerning curtilage and aerial surveillance,
however, undermine the security of this belief.
In Oliver v. United States9 the Court affirmed the so-called open
fields doctrine established in Hester v. United States.100 In Hester Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that the fourth amendment's special
protection of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" does not apply to
open fields. The curtilage, on the other hand, does receive the same
protection that is given to the home. 101 In Oliver the Court rejected a
claim that the respondents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
land on which they erected two fences and placed no-trespassing signs.
The Court found that the inquiry into what expectations are legitimate
is totally unrelated to the individual's effort to conceal "assertedly 'private' activity.

102

The proper question asks whether the government's

intrusion encroaches on the "personal and societal values" that the
fourth amendment protects. 103 Although the individual should have a
role in determining personal and societal values, this is not the message
of Oliver. Objective evaluation of personal privacy once again
controls. 104
98. See Gutterman, A Formulationof the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRAcusE L. REv. 647 (1988) (asserting that society values the privacy of activities normally carried on within the home).
99. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
100. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
101. Id. at 59.
102. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 & n.12.
103. Id. at 182-83.
104. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986). The Court in Ciraolo held that police aerial observation of marijuana plants in the
petitioner's backyard did not violate the fourth amendment. Similarly, in Dow the Court found
that photos taken from an airplane flown in navigable airspace above industrial plants, which revealed EPA violations, were obtained constitutionally. Neither surveillance was a fourth amendment search because any member of the public could observe the activity from the air. The Court
found that, although steps had been taken to conceal the activity from public view, the expectation
of privacy from all observation was unreasonable. See Dow, 476 U.S. at 235-39; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
214. Thus, pursuant to United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the expectation of privacy in
the marijuana plants or in the backyard, as well as in the chemical plant, was not one that an
ordinary member of society was willing to recognize as reasonable. In California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988), the Court held that a person has no societally recognized reasonable expectation of
privacy in trash left on the curb. The Court reasoned that once trash is placed on the curb, the
person leaving it assumes the risk of tampering by animals, children, and others. Id. at 40. Therefore, because a reasonable person knows that this meddling is possible, a warrantless search of the
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The absurdity of this analysis is revealed in the most recent aerial
surveillance decision. In Florida v. Riley 1 5 police surveyed property
within the curtilage of the respondent's home while hovering in a helicopter four hundred feet above the respondent's greenhouse. Two sides
of the greenhouse were enclosed. Trees, shrubs, and the respondent's
mobile home obscured the other two sides from view. Opaque roofing
panels covered the greenhouse, but two panels were missing, leaving approximately ten percent of the roof open. 106 An officer identified what
he thought was marijuana growing in the greenhouse and obtained a
search warrant based on this observation. Although the Court recognized that Riley took sufficient measures to establish his subjective expectation of privacy, it nonetheless found that no search occurred,
07
apparently because the helicopter was within "navigable airspace."

It

is hard to imagine an activity more intrusive than a helicopter hovering
at low altitude, kicking up dust, blaring noise above one's home, and
evoking images of a commando raid. Yet the Court deferred to Federal
Aviation Administration regulations. 08 Justice Byron White stated that
if law or regulation prohibited flying at that altitude, then the situation
would be different. The Court permitted the intrusion, however, because the minimum altitudes that define navigable airspace for other
aircraft do not apply to helicopters. 09
trash is not a constitutionally protected search according to Katz. Id. at 40-41.
105. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). See generally Recent Development, supra note 3.
106. Id. at 448.
107. Id. at 450-51.
108. The Court reiterated that "helicopters may be operated at less than the minimums for
fixed-wing aircraft 'if the operation is conducted without hazard to persons or property on the
surface.'" Id. at 451 n.3 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1988)).
109. Id. at 451: Because no lower limits exist for helicopters, even a flyby at 100 feet seems
permissible. In Riley Justice White concluded that "Riley could not reasonably have expected the
contents of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an officer seated in a fixed-wing
aircraft flying within navigable airspace at an altitude of 1,000 feet." Id. at 450. Just three years
earlier in Ciraolo the Court found that society would not honor any expectation of privacy from
low-flying aircraft at this altitude. See supra note 104. Furthermore, since fixed-wing aircraft are
permitted to fly at a lowest altitude of 500 feet, the respondent had no expectation of privacy at
that height. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450. Finally, because a helicopter is not fixed wing and can be
operated safely at lower altitudes, Riley should have no expectation of privacy at even below 500
feet. Apparently, Justice White concluded that Riley was on notice after Ciraolo (at least with
respect to low-flying aircraft at an altitude of 500 feet) and also should have known the helicopter
regulations as well. Id. at 450-51 & n.3. Given that no FAA minimum altitude limits exist for
helicopters, this self-supporting rationale leads to the conclusion that a low-altitude flyby of 100
feet or less is constitutionally permissible and that individuals cannot assert any reasonable expectation of privacy from the activity.
Recently, however, in People v. Pollock, 796 P.2d 63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), a Colorado court
invalidated a low-level overflight conducted by police to observe marijuana under cultivation. The
court found that the surveillance violated the homeowner's legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at
64-65. The court noted that it was quite unusual for helicopters to fly over a residence at 200 feet,
as occurred in the case. Id. The court noted also that the helicopter plainly caused a great deal of
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Previously, the Court analyzed the question of search by testing
the intrusiveness of the activity and considering expectations of privacy. In the chemical analysis setting, it found a field test not intrusive
because a field test determines only one piece of information-that a
substance is an illegal drug. In Riley the Court abandons even this narrow test, opting instead to rely on an administrative rule governing navigable airspace that is wholly irrelevant to constitutional protections
from intrusions into personal privacy.
Had the Court in the above cases found the police activity to constitute a search, it would have had to analyze whether the warrantless
searches violated the fourth amendment. Finding no search, however,
precluded this discussion. Definitional limitations on the words search
and seizure take the activity outside the protection of the fourth
amendment and, thus, eliminate any need for a warrant. Furthermore,
if an activity is not a search, then the Court does not need to inquire
whether it is reasonable.
These definitional limitations are the product of two milestones on
the Court's social agenda: (1) a desire to allow more aggressive police
investigative methods to root out crime, and (2) a distaste for the exclusionary rule-a sanction that disarms damning evidence. Individual
rights and liberties, however, dominate the expense side of this social
ledger. Police can hover in helicopters above private homes, drug enforcement agents can field test the contents of a personal travel kit, and
dogs can sniff luggage and perhaps even individual persons.
2.

Who Has Standing?

A similar limiting pattern emerges in the trilogy of cases establishing present requirements for standing to challenge a fourth amendment
violation. 110 To claim the benefit of the exclusionary rule, a party must
have standing to raise the issue."' Until 1978, all defendants who
claimed that a search violated their rights had "a key to the courtnoise and disturbance. Id. at 65. Thus, Pollock was distinguished from Riley. Pollock is also distinguishable from Dow, which permitted aerial surveillance with sophisticated equipment of a large
industrial plant. See supra note 104. Had the area in Dow been immediately adjacent to a private
home, however, the result might have been different.
110. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
111. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Prior to Jones, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955), chose to abolish the standing
requirement altogether. The court observed that "such a limitation virtually invites law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties and to trade the escape of a criminal whose
rights are violated for the conviction of others by the use of evidence illegally obtained against
them." Id. at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.
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room," or automatic standing to challenge the search. 112 A series of
three opinions authored by Justice Rehnquist overruled this automatic
standing rule and again diminished the protections of the fourth
amendment.
Beginning in 1978 with Rakas v. Illinois,'" and completed just two
15
years later in United States v. Salvuccil" and Rawlings v. Kentucky,"
the Court discarded the concept of standing as a separate inquiry in
fourth amendment cases. Rather, the focus shifted to whether a defendant's expectation of privacy was breached sufficiently that she personally was aggrieved by a search. Furthermore, the Court adroitly
changed the "reasonable expectation of privacy" language adopted from
Katz'" to an inquiry into the defendant's "legitimate expectation of
17
privacy."
In Rakas the Court denied standing to mere passengers in the car
that police had searched because the passengers asserted no possessory
or property interest in the car or items seized."' The door to the courtroom for fourth amendment litigants and the protections of a warrant,
however, still were available to owners or possessors of property.
In Salvucci the Court abolished the automatic standing rule of
Jones v. United States"9 and held that "defendants charged with
crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary
112. Jones, 362 U.S. at 257. Standing is the "key to the courtroom" because one must have
standing to assert a claim. Absent standing, the person cannot even come before the Court. Id. at
259 (indicating that without standing, a petitioner may not raise a legal issue before a court).
113. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
114. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
115. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
116. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
117. See, e.g., Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148.
118. The Court concluded:
[P]etitioners' claims must fail. They asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in
the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized. As we have previously indicated, the
fact that they were "legitimately on [the] premises" in the sense that they were in the car
with permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. Thus, the government introduced into evidence the items seized from the
automobile on petitioners' armed robbery charge.
Perhaps the most egregious example of the inequitable result of Rakas is found in United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). In Payner Internal Revenue Service investigators deliberately engaged in illegal activity and stole the briefcase of a Bahamian bank executive to photograph documents contained within. Id. at 730. The government then used the documents to
convict depositors like Payner of tax fraud. Thus, the government manipulated the standing requirement by deliberately violating the rights of a third party to obtain evidence against its real
targets, who were powerless to object. "Because this type of prosecution was precisely what the
agents had in mind when they egregiously violated the bank official's Fourth Amendment rights,
the case dramatically illustrates how the standing limitation can encourage unconstitutional police
activity." P. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURR 281 (1988).
119. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated. 1 20 Relying on his own language in Rakas, Justice Rehnquist
wrote that "an illegal search only violates the rights of those who have
'a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' ,,121 The
Court remanded the case to determine whether the defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in stolen mail located in the home of
the defendant's mother.
The same day that the Court eliminated automatic standing in
Salvucci, the Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky narrowed the holding in
Rakas and virtually eliminated possession as a basis for standing. In
Rawlings police officers armed with an arrest warrant for Marquess
went to his house and found four other persons there with him. Pursuant to a search warrant to search Marquess's house, which was issued
forty-five minutes after the police arrived, the police ordered Ms. Cox,
one of the four house guests, to empty her purse. Over 1800 tablets of
LSD and other controlled substances tumbled from the purse. David
Rawlings immediately claimed possession of the drugs in Cox's purse, 2 '
which under Rakas would have given him standing to challenge the
search.
The Supreme Court held, however, that Rawlings had no standing
because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Ms. Cox's purse.
Justice Rehnquist stated that Rawlings's ownership of the drugs was to
be considered, but Rehnquist emphasized that Rakas rejected the princould be asserted based on
ciple that fourth amendment protections
M 23
"'arcane' concepts of property law.

120. See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85. In Jones the Court recognized the need for automatic
standing. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. In Salvucci the Court rationalized abolishing the automatic standing rule because 12 years earlier, in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968), the Court held that a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used
as substantive evidence of guilt at trial. See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 89-90. Thus, because a defendant's testimony regarding standing could not be admitted as a confession, the self-incrimination
dilemma no longer existed. Id. at 90.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, however, argues that Simmons does not fully cure the selfincrimination dilemma for two reasons. First, testimony at a suppression hearing still may be used
to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial. Justice Marshall avers that the impeachment process
would subject a defendant to the same dilemma of self-incrimination unless he were to forfeit his
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf. This, he feared, would deter raising fourth amendment claims. Id. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Second, forcing a defendant to argue for standing
at a suppression hearing could allow the prosecution to elicit testimony beyond that given on direct examination. Justice Marshall argued that even if this additional testimony could not be used
at trial, it still may be useful to the prosecution in formulating strategy or developing its case. Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Because of these advantages, Justice Marshall concluded that the problem of self-incrimination persists despite Simmons. See id. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-92 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140).
122. 448 U.S. at 101.
123. Id. at 105 (citing Rakes, 439 U.S. at 149-50).
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By manipulating the "legitimately on the premises" language from
Jones, Justice Rehnquist quietly and smoothly redefined search. Justice
Rehnquist shifted the inquiry from a violation of a reasonable expecta124
tion of privacy to a violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy,
thus revising the Katz search test. He then carried over the legitimate
expectation of privacy test to the context of standing.
In Place and Jacobsen the Court adopted the standing language to
redefine search, concluding that an intrusion which "merely discloses
whether or not a particular substance is [illegitimate] does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. '' 121 The existence of the legitimate expectation language in the standing cases supported this change
even though it was quite radical. The result is that a defendant charged
with possession of narcotics never should be able to establish a fourth
amendment violation-either that the defendant's justified expectation
of privacy was violated, or that a search took place.
3.

Habeas Corpus and the Fourth Amendment

In Stone v. Powell 26 the Court carved out a major exception to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, while simultaneously minimizing
the importance of the warrant requirement and the fourth amendment
generally. Powell is significant to this Article's thesis because it highlights the Court's preference for denying rights to the guilty, a critical
element in the breakdown of the warrant requirement.
Pursuant to federal statute, prisoners who have exhausted state
remedies can petition for federal court review of their case if they meet
the requirements for federal habeas corpus.1 7 Prior to 1953 defendants
were most likely to have their cases heard in federal court if they could
support a claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or had committed an error so fundamental that the trial court lost its jurisdiction. s
In Brown v. Allen" 9 the Supreme Court expanded the scope of federal
habeas to include any claim of federal constitutional error arising in
124. This shift in language comes back to haunt defendants in cases like Jacobsen and Place.
For an insightful analysis of how Justice Rehnquist adeptly employs language to mold the law, see
Rahdert, William Rehnquist's Judicial Craft: A Case Study, 60 TEMP.L.Q. 841, 856-59 (1987).
125. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123; see also supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
126. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
127. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal courts have had the authority to issue the
writ of Habeas Corpus-known as the "Great Writ." The federal courts' authority to issue the writ
arises from 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), which allows the court to issue the writ when a person is "in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Id. § 2254(a).
128. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). See generally Friedman, A Tale of Two
Habeas, 73 MINN. L. Rav. 247 (1988).
129. 344 U.S. 443 (1952).
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state criminal proceedings.130 Twenty-three years later in Powell, the
Court eliminated fourth amendment violations from constitutional errors worthy of habeas review. The Court stated plainly: "[W]here the
State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." ' '
Although laden with ambiguities,13 Powell creates a hierarchy of
constitutional rights for criminal procedure that ensures a place at the
bottom for fourth amendment violations. 33 In Powell the Court stated
130. Prior to Brown, the primary basis for a federal habeas claim was the question of jurisdictional error. Id. at 500. In Brown the Court took the extraordinary step of expanding the writ of
habeas corpus to include all cases containing a question of constitutional error. The rationale for
this bold step was not articulated in the opinion and unfortunately remains unclear to this day.
Nevertheless, for purposes of this Article, I proceed from the generally accepted proposition that
Brown created an expansion of the writ to include claims of constitutional error adjudicated by
state courts. See, e.g., Powell, 428 U.S. at 476 (tracing the development of federal habeas jurisdiction and noting the expansion in Brown); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that a state
prisoner may apply for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court if a constitutional violation
is alleged and all state remedies have been exhausted, but that the petitioner may not be granted
federal habeas review if any state remedies were waived). See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 462 (1963); Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 463
(1960). For a comprehensive discussion of the historical development of the writ and an insightful
analysis of the Brown rationale, see Friedman, supra note 128.
131. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494.
132. The opinion is confusing, for although on its face it is a habeas corpus case addressing
the scope of federal jurisdiction, much of its language is devoted to devaluing the fourth amendment as constitutional doctrine. While Powell affirms the Mapp rule that the fourth and fourteenth amendments require exclusion from trial of evidence seized in violation of their
commandments and reversal upon direct appeal, it excludes the exclusionary rule on collateral
appeal. Powell construes the difference between direct appeal and habeas in pragmatic rather than
constitutional terms, finding no utility in applying the exclusionary rule on collateral review. Justice Lewis Powell's opinion further clouds the issues by avoiding "direct confrontation with the
incontrovertible facts that the habeas statutes have . . . always been construed to grant jurisdiction to entertain Fourth Amendment claims of both state and federal prisoners." Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Powell mentions in passing a "guilt-related" basis for habeas
jurisdiction: he argues that "[r]esort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure
that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on
values important to our system of government." Id. at 491 n.31. Justice Powell assures us, however,
that the opinion is not an endorsement of habeas jurisdiction only for constitutional claims bearing
on innocence. Justice Powell concluded: "Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of the
habeas corpus statutes as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally." Id. at 494-95
n.37 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the case has become one of the leading opinions attacking
the fourth amendment rights of criminal defendants and the exclusionary rule. But see Friedman,
supra note 128, at 284. Professor Barry Friedman argues that Powell cannot be read simply as a
fourth amendment case because it fails to distinguish consideration of fourth amendment claims
on direct review as compared with habeas. Id. Specifically, footnote 31 discusses a "guilt-related"
rationale for habeas, and later cases downplay the differences between fourth amendment rationales and innocence-based claims. Id.
133. Justice Brennan, however, read Powell as much broader than just an attack on the
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that fourth amendment violations are different from fifth or sixth
amendment violations because "claims of illegal search and seizure do
not 'impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable.' ,,184 The Court characterized the exclusionary rule as merely a tool used to discourage law enforcement officers
from violating the fourth amendment.135 Thus, although the majority
did not address directly a guilt-based theory for habeas, it did suggest
that at least in federal court, the fourth amendment is a protection for
the innocent, not the guilty.
In a single opinion, Stone v. Powell limited the fourth amendment
to a degree that had taken the Court years to achieve in both standing
and definitional cases. Together the preceding three developments dilute the warrant requirement and allow the Court to avoid the invocation of the exclusionary rule. The Court, however, has not been content
to stop here.
4. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
In Katz v. United States s6 the Court held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
fourth amendment exclusionary rule. He charged that the Court generally was limiting all federal
habeas jurisdiction and challenged its authority to do so. Justice Brennan argued:
To be sure, my Brethren are hostile to the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule as part
and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, as
today's decision in United States v. Janis, [428 U.S. 433 (1976)], confirms. But these cases,
despite the veil of Fourth Amendment terminology employed by the Court, plainly do not
involve any question of the right of a defendant to have evidence excluded from use against
him in his criminal trial when that evidence was seized in contravention of rights ostensibly
secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, they involve the question of
availability of a federal forum for vindicating those federally guaranteed rights. Today's holding portends substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction ...
Id. at 502-03 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Seidman, supra note 59, at 453.
Professor Michael Seidman argues that Justice Brennan mischaracterized the majority approach
by accusing it of "reducing constitutional requirements to 'mere utilitarian tools,' designed solely
to separate guilty from innocent defendants." Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Seidman actually
finds that Powell "turns out to be quite a narrow decision" and whatever it accomplished, "the
[Powell] Court. . . certainly did not disown the exclusionary rule." Id. at 452, 453.
134. Powell, 428 U.S. at 479 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969)).
135. See id. Justice Powell could have reached a similar result in Powell by entertaining the
guilt-related theory of habeas jurisdiction-that incarcerated persons raising fourth amendment
claims have no right to federal habeas because their claims are irrelevant to their innocence. Many
scholars actually suspect that this theory is what Chief Justice Burger had in mind when he assigned the opinion to Justice Powell. Justice Powell instead chose to denounce the costs attendant
to the exclusionary rule and found no basis for habeas jurisdiction because no utilitarian purposes
are served by applying the exclusionary rule in a habeas proceeding.
136. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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exceptions. ' i 7 Perhaps no more frequently quoted statement is less
true. The narrow exceptions doctrine, premised on the need to abandon
time-consuming warrant procedures in situations requiring speedy action,1 83 has given way to an extensive list of exceptions. These exceptions invariably have more to do with preserving incriminating evidence
than acting quickly in emergency situations. 139
The initial justification for permitting a warrantless search was tailored narrowly to meet the need for quick action in circumstances in
which it was impracticable to obtain a warrant. 14 0 Thus, in Carroll v.
United States1 4 1 the Court affirmed a warrantless search of an automo-

bile, which the officers had probable cause to believe contained contraband, because the automobile could leave the jurisdiction before the
officers had time to obtain
a search warrant. This became known as the
' ' 142
"automobile exception.

Over the next fifty years, a host of additional exceptions were
added to the the automobile exception. By 1978, situations in which the
Court permitted warrantless searches or searches based on a lesser
standard than probable cause included: searches incident to a lawful
137. Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
138. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that the taking of a
blood sample from an accused without a warrant was an appropriate procedure incident to a valid
arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(recognizing the need for warrantless searches of automobiles when it is impractical to secure a
warrant, "because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought").
139. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints requiring motorists to stop and answer brief questions by police); Horton v. California, 110
S. Ct. 2301 (990) (finding that inadvertence is not a requirement to seizure of evidence under the
plain view doctrine); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990) (extending the scope of a search
incident to lawful arrest to allow a protective sweep throughout the entire premises); United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990) (holding that a search of a foreign national's home
without a warrant is not prohibited by the fourth amendment); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987) (junkyards); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) ("open field" observations in a
locked barn on private property surrounded by two fences).
140. See, e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
141. Id. at 132.
142. In Carroll the Court explained:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect
of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant ....
Id. at 153. Carrollactually was nothing more than an exigent circumstance: the officers had probable cause and they had to act quickly or risk losing the contraband. Had the Court simply discussed this as an exigent circumstance, rather than belabor the difference between vehicles and
structures, perhaps many later exceptions could have been avoided.
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arrest,14 administrative searches, 14' stop-and-frisk searches, 145 consent
1 48
searches,146 plain view seizures,1 4 7 delayed probable cause searches,

and border searches.1 49 Nevertheless, in Mincey v. Arizona1 50 Justice
Stewart echoed the tenet of Katz that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable "'subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.' "151 Since 1978, each of these exceptions has ex-

panded to encompass new situations, and the Court also has created
additional exceptions. 152 For example, an immobile vehicle now falls
within the automobile exception;1 53 a search incident to arrest is not
limited to the area within the immediate vicinity of the arrestee;1 14 a
"brief" Terry-stop can last for as long as one hour; 15 5 if police act reasonably, apparent consent is valid even if given by someone with no
143. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
144. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
145. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (holding that a third party may
consent to a search of another's area if the parties have joint access or control over the area and it
reasonably can be concluded that any of the cohabitants have the right to consent); Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (holding that by allowing a cousin to use and keep a bag, the defendant
assumed the risk of the cousin consenting to a search of its contents and, therefore, the consent
and warrantless search was valid).
147. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
148. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
150. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
151. Citing Katz, Justice Stewart wrote: "The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable ... subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' Id. at 390 (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984) (reaffirming that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable).
152. In the 1975 Term alone, the Court decided five cases that reduced the protection of the
warrant clause. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that a fixedborder checkpoint search need not be authorized by a warrant); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976) (permitting warrantless inventory search of car); United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38 (1976) (upholding the warrantless arrest of a person standing in the doorway of a house);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (permitting warrantless arrest for a felony); Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (holding that probable cause to search an automobile on the scene supports a warrantless search later at the station house).
153. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (holding that the automobile exception includes a stationary mobile home because of the home's potential mobility and society's
lesser expectation of privacy because of the pervasive regulation of mobile homes and
automobiles); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (ruling that the automobile exception covers an immobile vehicle in a police impound lot).
154. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (discussed supra note 38); see also
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (discussed supra note 38).
155. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding that a 20-minute detention
alongside a highway of a car suspected of containing drugs is not unreasonable); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that a 90-minute detention of luggage was an unreasonable
seizure).
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lawful authority to consent;156 warrantless probable cause searches will
be upheld days after the determination of probable cause;157 administrative exceptions include almost any business subject to regulation; 158 a
warrantless sixteen-hour detention of a suspected smuggler at a border
is reasonable;15 9 and finally, the good faith exception allows broad admissibility of the fruits of searches made in good faith reliance on defective warrants.'10
Exceptions to the warrant requirement would not be so troubling if
they fit into what Justice Stewart called the specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.1 61 The body of exceptions, however, has
consumed the warrant requirement, and justifications for the new exceptions often bear no relation to their original rationale. In Carroll the
Court loosened a thread from the warrant clause. Each new exception
has lengthened that thread. One more substantial tug could unravel
completely the fabric of the fourth amendment.
5.

The Reasonableness Test

Recently the Supreme Court has been paying great favor to the
reasonableness language found in the first clause of the fourth amendment, which protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures." '
The Court's reasonableness test may be just the tug that leaves the
fourth amendment in tatters.
The reasonableness or balancing test looks very similar to an exception to the warrant requirement, accomplishes similar objectives,
and arguably is based on the same rationale. For example, if the Court
looks only to the reasonableness of a search or seizure, it can circumvent the probable cause and particularity criteria of the warrant requirement in much the same way as an exception. Because the first
clause of the fourth amendment can be read separately from the second, 6 s however, it is not labeled an exception. Advocates of a reasona156. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990) (discussed supra note 3).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) (holding that the warrantless
search of a vehicle three days after it was seized is not unreasonable if the officers had probable
cause to search).
158. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (allowing a warrantless administrative search of a junkyard because junkyards are pervasively regulated).
159. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (holding that the
warrantless detention of a suspected alimentary canal smuggler for over 16 hours is not
unreasonable).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
161. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390.
162. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
163. Indeed, recent opinions suggest that certain members of the Court would prefer to
change the comma after the word "violated" to a semicolon, making the reasonableness clause
independent of the probable clause requirement. In other words: "The right of the people to be
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bleness analysis agree that under the fourth amendment a search can
be reasonable regardless of whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant. 164 A warrant is only one element of a reasonable search. Thus,
probable cause and particularity are no longer essential prerequisites of
a search. The most significant effect of the reasonableness test, however, has been to shift the focus of the fourth amendment from a pro16 5
tection of the people to a threshold for police.
Interpreting the reasonableness clause as separate from the warrant requirement gained acceptance through a gradual evolution of
search and seizure law. As part of the evisceration of the warrant requirement and concurrent reduction of fourth amendment protections,
the Court shifted its focus away from procedural regularity in the preservation of individual rights toward a reasonableness approach that assesses the conduct of police under the totality of the circumstances of
each case."e ' Ironically, this isolation of the warrant clause from the reasonableness clause evolved from decisions that enshrined warrants as
the benchmark of a reasonable search or seizure.
a.

The Terry-Camara Legacy

In two landmark cases in the late 1960s, the Court moved away
from a strict probable cause standard as the prerequisite of a search or
secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Deconstruction of
the clauses in this fashion legitimizes the simple reasonableness approach when police officers act
without a warrant. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In each of these cases the Court completely skipped over any warrant and probable cause analysis with little or no discussion; all of the
searches were executed without a warrant. Many of the lower courts worked painstakingly to decide whether the lack of a warrant or probable cause was, as a preliminary matter, fatal to the
search. The Supreme Court, however, went right to reasonableness, which is consistent with the
majority's reading of the first clause as separate and distinct from the warrant clause. See infra
subpart H(B)(5)(b).
164. For example, in Skinner Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote:
For the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that
are unreasonable. What is reasonable, of course, "depends on all the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself." Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described in the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment .... We have recognized exceptions to this rule,
however....
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted).
165. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
166. While the Court previously had acknowledged a reasonableness approach to fourth
amendment jurisprudence, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), firmly established this principle. See infra subpart H(B)(5)(a).
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seizure and indelibly altered the warrant requirement.1 67 In Terry v.
Ohio ee the Court held that a person could be detained briefly upon less
than probable cause, and an officer could "pat down" the suspect's
outer clothing in the interest of police safety if the officer had a reasonable belief that the person was armed and presently dangerous. 8 9 Terry
reflects the Court's sensitivity to the tension between the warrant requirement and the need for police officers to act quickly in the face of
crime. The result is a compromise-a relaxation of the standards of
probable cause in the name of reasonableness. 1 70 The Terry Court in-

tended to create a narrowly circumscribed exception to the probable
cause requirement that was tailored to law enforcement needs without
unduly infringing upon individual liberty.' 7 ' The opinion, however, has
since become the foundation for the reasonableness analysis that dominates recent fourth amendment decisions. Thus, the Warren Court unintentionally laid the groundwork for separating probable cause from
reasonableness.17 2 Only Justice William Douglas expressed concern over
167. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 1; Camara, 387 U.S. at 523.
168. 392 U.S. at 1.
169. Id. at 30-31. Prior to 1968, a seizure of a person was considered an arrest requiring
probable cause. Searches of the person could be conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest that was
based on probable cause. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
170. Indeed the Court referred to its recent opinion in Camara to assess the contours of the
reasonableness standard it was embracing:
[T]o assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a general proposition, it is
necessary "first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen," for there is "no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."
Id. at 20-21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35, 536-37).
171. The Terry stop was to be brief-only long enough to confirm or allay an officer's suspicion that criminal activity was "afoot." See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (holding that the removal of a suspect to the station house exceeded the narrowly circumscribed brief
detention permitted by Terry and amounted to an unlawful arrest without probable cause). Moreover, the Terry frisk was limited to a search only for weapons. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968) (holding that pursuant to a Terry stop, a search of a suspect's pocket was unlawful because
the officer was looking for narcotics, not weapons).
172. The Warren Court gradually created a test that relied on traditional probable causewarrant analysis to decide reasonableness. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(Stewart, J.) (deciding that outside of a search of the area within an arrestee's control, a search of
the premises must be made pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Stewart, J.) (holding that when authorized, electronic eavesdropping
can be done only with probable cause); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 40 (Warren, C.J.) (ruling that a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause in order to make a valid search incident to the
arrest); Camara, 387 U.S. at 523 (White, J.) (holding that a warrantless search of private premises
is unreasonable except in well-defined circumstances); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(Brennan, J.) (holding that warrantless searches are unreasonable unless there are exigent circumstances); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (Black, J.) (holding that warrantless searches are
unreasonable, but an automobile may be searched with probable cause because of its inherent
mobility); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (Brennan, J.) (holding that warrants gener-
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that a search could be
the impact of the new ruling, finding it a mystery
178
cause.
probable
of
reasonable in the absence
In Camara v. Municipal Court17 and its companion case, See v.
City of Seattle, the Court created a new warrant-one that was noncriminal and not based on probable cause. Prior to 1967, the Court did
not consider noncriminal inspections of residences or businesses for
code violations searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Because these intrusions were significant and presented a dangerous potential for abuse, however, the Court brought the activities within the
jurisdiction of the fourth amendment and imposed a warrant requirement on administrative searches. The Court relaxed the standard for
obtaining an administrative warrant, however, which allowed greater
flexibility to conduct administrative searches. If the inspection is based
on reasonable legislative or administrative standards, then probable
cause exists for conducting an "area search." Thus, the Court eliminated the particularity requirement of the warrant clause.
Just as in Terry, the Camara Court adopted a compromise. The
fourth amendment is clear that warrants shall not issue "but upon
probable cause . . .particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized. 17 Obviously convinced that the
judgment of a neutral and detached magistrate should precede an administrative search, the Court chose to apply a warrant requirement;
cognizant that the rule might be too burdensome, however, it eliminated the particularity demand. 7 7 The area warrant, therefore, began
ally are needed to make a search reasonable, but exigencies or a search incident to a lawful arrest
do not require a warrant); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (Goldberg, J.) (holding
that a warrant must be based on probable cause, not conclusions about probable cause); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (Goldberg, J.) (requiring that the evaluation of the constitutionality of
a search begins with a warrant based on probable cause); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)
(Stewart, J.) (finding that the search of a hotel room without a warrant is unreasonable even with
clerk's consent); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (Black, J.) (finding that a search
without a warrant, remote in time or place from arrest, is unreasonable). In addition, several cases
were decided on the premise that searching a home without a warrant or exigent circumstances is
unreasonable. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (Whittaker, J.); Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.).
173. Terry, 392 U.S. at 38.
174. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
175. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
176.

U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).

177. While the Court recently has given its imprimatur to far more egregious intrusions without a warrant, in the late 1960s the Court apparently found the inspection of a home or business
for noncriminal activity unreasonable in the absence of a warrant or exception. In United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), for example, the 27-hour detention of a woman suspected of smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal was found reasonable given the "longstanding
concern for the protection of the integrity of the border." Id. at 538. Justice Brennan candidly
observed:
Something has gone fundamentally awry in our constitutional jurisprudence when a neu-
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the Court's departure from the strict probable cause required to issue a
warrant.1 7 8 This new probable cause standard represented a broader
concept of reasonableness based on weighing governmental and individual interests. 7 9
The Terry-Camara reasonableness test balances the individual's
interest in privacy with the government's interest in crime prevention
and safety. The Terry stop is reasonable because when a police officer
has an articulable suspicion that a particular individual has or is about
to engage in criminal activity, the officer's need to investigate outweighs
the intrusion on the individual. The area warrant in Camarais reasonable because such a search is noncriminal, it is practically impossible to
adhere to a strict particularity standard, and the danger presented by a
potential code violation outweighs the individual's privacy interest.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.180 the Court abandoned its Terry-Camara
compromise attitude and eliminated completely the need for warrants
and probable cause in certain circumstances. In addressing the authority of a public school official to conduct a warrantless search of a student's purse for evidence of a school rule violation, the Court signaled
that perhaps it was beginning to tackle the substantive dimension of
the fourth amendment. Justice White, writing for a five-member majority, reasoned that the fourth amendment requires all searches and
seizures to be reasonable, but although "'both the concept of probable
cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a
search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.' "181

The Court struck a balance between the legitimate expectation of privacy of school children and the school's "equally legitimate" need to
tral and detached magistrate's authorization is required before the authorities may inspect
"the plumbing, heating, ventilation, gas, and electrical systems" in a person's home, investigate the back rooms of his workplace, or poke through the charred remains of his gutted
garage, but not before they may hold him in indefinite involuntary isolation at the Nation's

border to investigate whether he might be engaged in criminal wrongdoing.
Id. at 555-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

178. Historical analysis of the fourth amendment may amount to nothing more than speculation. When we speak of the Framers' intent, we must acknowledge that they surely were not all of
one mind. Nevertheless, it seems rather apparent that administrative searches were the violations
with which the Framers were intimately familiar and primarily concerned at the time of the drafting. Intrusions by King George's roving patrols, authorized by writs of assistance to look for administrative violations of the tax and customs rules, were the very searches against which the
colonists were reacting. It is, thus, most ironic that modern interpretation reduces fourth amend-

ment protections in just the situation that we most clearly can trace back to its origin.
179. See, e.g., Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MiNN. L. Rav. 383, 385 (1988) (discussing Camaraand Terry as the precursors to a "broad reasonableness standard and an ill-defined balancing test").
180. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
181. Id. at 340 (emphasis added) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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maintain a positive learning environment. 182 The Court's finding that
the unique nature of the school setting required its exemption from
warrants and probable cause illuminated a shift in philosophy. Reasonableness now dominates the Court's inquiry. T.L.O.'s promise to start a
substantive discussion of the breadth and scope of the fourth amendment, however, remains unfulfilled. Rather, the legacy of T.L.O. is just
as Justice William Brennan predicted when he denounced the reasonableness-balancing test as a step toward a "neutral utilitarian
calculus" s that renders the warrant requirement meaningless and
leads to "doctrinally destructive nihilism."'18 4 While a reasonableness
standard acknowledges the need to address the substantive choices required by competing interests, it establishes a balancing scale of justice
that too easily can be tipped by the heavy hand of government. 8 5
b.

The Fourth Amendment As a Due Process Test

Little more than twenty years after Camara and Terry, we witness
not only the breakdown of both the warrant and probable cause requirements, but also the emergence of a sliding-scale reasonableness
8
test. In the reasonableness cases that follow T.L.O.,"'
the Court ad182. Id.
183. Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a more general discussion of the reasonableness trend
and the controversy among lower courts, practitioners, and scholars, see Serr, Great Expectations
of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583 (1989); Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least
Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988); and Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn
Toward a GeneralReasonablenessInterpretationof the FourthAmendment, 27 AM. CUM. L. REv.
119 (1989).
185. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 1472; Wasserstrom, supra note 184, at 126-30. Professor
Craig Bradley has suggested that adopting a pure reasonableness standard would be a suitable
means to ameliorate fourth amendment confusion. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 1472. Bradley
calls his reasonableness test Model 1. He advocates that "Model I, by presenting an unabashedly
unclear rule that provides no guidelines, will never have to be modified to suit an unusual fact
situation." Id. (emphasis in original).
Later on he states that Model I will "extract the Court from the tarbaby of fourth amendment
law," id. at 1488, because the Court rarely will have to "involve itself in decisions that are unique
to the facts of each case." Id. Bradley concludes that "exclusionary law can be restored to the
common sense proposition that evidence obtained unreasonably must always be excluded and evidence obtained reasonably should always be admitted. Such a rule makes far better sense." Id.
It is completely baffling to me how an unclear rule can advance constitutional doctrine, eliminate confusion, reduce litigation, and still make sense. I reject the reasonableness analysis because
it fails to recognize the essence of fourth amendment values. Reasonableness is appealing because
it eliminates fourth amendment confusion simply by eliminating all the rules. A pure reasonableness test, however, focuses too much on after-the-fact evaluations of police conduct. In so doing, it
sacrifices the personal guarantees of the fourth amendment.
186. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (finding
reasonable the suspicionless testing of employees who apply for promotion to positions directly
involving the interdiction of illegal drugs and the carrying of a firearm); Skinner v. Railway Labor

1991]

REWORKING THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

509

vances a fourth amendment "special needs" test. Unlike the T.L.O. balancing test, however, the special needs test fails even to address the
competing interests at stake.187 Instead of defining the parameters of
the limited circumstances in which warrants and probable cause are unnecessary, the Court refers to special needs in a vague and conclusory
manner. As Justice Antonin Scalia charged in his concurring opinion in
O'Connor v. Ortega, the special needs test becomes a "standard so devoid of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty." 18 8
Traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence 8 9 requires a multistage procedural analysis to determine the following: (1) whether a
search or seizure of a protected person or area occurred;190 (2) whether
the warrant that authorized the search or seizure was based on suffiExecutives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding that blood, breath, and urine tests of railroad employees to determine drug usage should be judged by a standard of reasonableness, not particularized suspicion); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding that a public employer's
intrusions into the privacy interests of government employees for investigations of work-related
misconduct should be judged by a standard of reasonableness). For a discussion of Skinner and
Von Raab, see supra note 36.
187. Arguably, while the T.L.O. Court discussed the competing interests at stake, it failed to
address them as candidly as it should have. In further defining reasonableness, the Court adopted
the two-prong test from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968): a search must be (1) justified at its
inception and (2) reasonable in scope. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
The search in T.L.O., however, fails both elements of the test. First, the search was not justified at its inception because smoking was a school violation, carrying cigarettes was not. Assistant
Vice Principal Choplick's search of a student's bag could reveal only possession of cigarettes, which
is not a reasonable basis to initiate this search. Second, if Choplick were searching for cigarettes or
marijuana, opening and reading the letter most likely would not reveal the physical presence of
marijuana. Thus, by searching a place in which the marijuana reasonably could not be found, the
scope of the search was too broad.
188. 480 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, the author of the special
needs language first appearing in T.L.O., filed a strong dissent in O'Connor.He charged the Court
with failing to pay attention to the facts and fabricating a dispute. He stated: "The plurality,
however, discovers what it feels is a factual dispute: the plurality is not certain whether the search
was routine or investigatory." Id. at 733 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Because a special needs test always will be fact specific, he expresses serious concern with the
plurality's willingness to apply the standard when the facts remain in dispute. Justice Blackmun
correctly highlights the dangers of loosely applying a fact-specific standard:
Because this analysis, when conducted properly, is always fact specific to an extent, it is inappropriate that the plurality's formulation of a standard does not arise from a sustained consideration of a particular factual situation. Moreover, given that any standard ultimately rests
on judgments about factual situations, it is apparent that the plurality has assumed the existence of hypothetical facts from which its standard follows. These "assumed" facts are
weighted in favor of the public employer, and, as a result, the standard that emerges makes
reasonable almost any workplace search by a public employer.
Id. at 733-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
189. Traditional interpretation emphasizes the warrant clause as essential to the meaning of
the fourth amendment. Justice Stewart is credited as being the advocate of this traditional approach to the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 152 (1969), in which he
first advocated this strict approach.
190. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (explaining that a search is a violation of
the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy).

510

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:473

cient probable cause 91 and particularity; 192 (3) if no warrant preceded
the search or seizure, whether the activity falls into one of the accepted
exceptions to the warrant requirement;19 3 and (4) if no warrant is obtained and the activity is not within one of the well-defined exceptions,
whether the search or seizure, nonetheless, is legal because it was based
on probable cause.1 94 The reasonableness approach to fourth amendment jurisprudence asks, regardless of whether the police had a warrant: Was their conduct in this particular search reasonable? 195 Among
the traditional elements of the reasonableness test are two fundamental
inquiries: (1) Was the search justified at its inception-as in Terry, did
the police officer have a particularized suspicion before approaching the
person? and (2) Was the search justified in scope-again, as in Terry,
was it limited to a protective nonevidentiary search?" 6 The Court
abandons the elements of both the traditional and the reasonableness
approaches when it uses the special needs test.
The move toward a basically standardless standard-a special
needs test-was first evident in O'Connor v. Ortega 97 when the plurality suggested almost casually that individualized suspicion may not be a
prerequisite of a reasonableness analysis. 198 Although individual suspicion always was a major consideration in the balancing test, the plurality's ambivalence undermined its role in subsequent decisions.
The Court seized the opportunity to cultivate the O'Connor suggestion in the two employee drug testing cases the following Term. In
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,9 and its companion case National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,0 0 the
Court eliminated the individualized suspicion requirement when the
government has a special need to perform drug testing.20 1 In Von Raab
191. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that probable cause is determined by
evaluating the totality of the circumstances).
192. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
193. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
194. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
195. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 69, at 136.
196. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (holding that a search of a suspect's
pockets after a Terry stop was unreasonable because the officer had no reason to fear the suspect
was armed).
197. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
198. Justice O'Connor stated: "Because petitioners had an 'individualized suspicion' of misconduct by Dr. Ortega, we need not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element
of the standard of reasonableness that we adopt today." Id. at 726; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
199. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
200. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
201. Although Skinner received media attention, Von Raab presents the greater challenge to
the fourth amendment. Because of the dangers associated with smuggling and interdiction of ilMegal narcotics, the Court reasoned that warrants, probable cause, and individualized suspicion were
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the government convinced five members of the Court that a special
need existed to test. Justice Scalia noted in a pointed dissent, however,
that the drug testing policy could not solve any present problems in the
Customs Service because the government failed to provide any evidence
that any of the alleged problems actually existed. In Justice Scalia's
own words, the government failed to recite "even a single instance in
'20 2
which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred.

The employment drug testing searches sharply highlight the deconstruction of fourth amendment principles that occurs when the Court
abandons warrants and probable cause and adopts a broad reasonable-

ness approach. 203 The result of this deconstruction is highly discretion-

ary searches and seizures, which require a post hoc determination of
reasonableness. As Skinner and Von Raab reveal, however, the special
needs test ignores even fourth amendment reasonableness requirements. Such an approach dooms the fourth amendment.
The problem with a general reasonableness standard is that it really is no standard at all because the determination depends on who is
gauging reasonableness. What is reasonable to one person, or one judge,
may be unreasonable to another. The sliding scale of reasonableness
leads to special needs tests, which are subject to abuse from conservative and liberal ideologues. A liberal need only decide that a search is
unreasonable. Conservatives, such as a majority of the presently constituted Court, can find all but the most egregious activity reasonable. Accordingly, absent a grievously outrageous intrusion,0 4 the Court deems
almost all searches reasonable. As Professor Uviller states, "the Court
has loosened its commitment to rigorous enforcement of privacy rights,
not necessary to test customs workers. The Court justified its opinion without any hard data that

customs officers were succumbing to smugglers' temptations and with the misleading reference to
the fact that several officers had been terminated for bribes and other integrity violations. Almost
no instances of drug usage by persons in the targeted category actually occurred. Moreover, those
officers removed from the force for bribes took them in cases unrelated to the facts at issue. See id.
at 668-77.
202. Justice Scalia stated:
The Court's opinion. . . will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that
will be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees ....
What is absent in the Government's justifications-notably absent, revealingly absent,
and as far as I am concerned, dispositively absent-is the recitation of even a single instance
in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the
cause of bribetaking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise
of classified information, was drug use.
Id. at 681, 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
203. For a thorough discussion of the erosion of the warrant requirement and a criticism of
the reasonableness approach as applied to government drug testing of employees, see Note, Government Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness,43 V&MD. L. Rav. 1343 (1990).
204. The Court requires action so gross that it shocks the conscience of the Court. See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
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abandoning the field to the 'conservative' due processors, who are adept
0 5
at finding a reasonable reason for most law enforcement activity.'

Of the various attacks on the warrant requirement and fourth
amendment protections, this recent due process approach epitomizes
the continuing dismemberment of the fourth amendment. If only those
acts that are contrary to the principles of ordered liberty and justice are
deemed unreasonable, 0 6 the Court reduces the fourth amendment to a
due process test. Because the Constitution already has a due process
clause in the fourteenth amendment, 0 7 the fourth amendment, thus,
becomes superfluous.
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW

STANDARD

Drastic action is needed to revitalize the fourth amendment. Inconsistent and conflicting decisions on warrants and the procedures attendant to their use have eroded the fourth amendment. Meanwhile, the
reasonableness test has become so subject to the political and social
passions of the moment that it threatens to obliterate completely the
personal protections that the fourth amendment safeguards.
Over about the last twenty years, the warrant has evolved from being an absolute prerequisite of police intrusions upon persons and their
possessions and to the use of the fruits of any search or arrest, 08 to a
procedural requirement sometimes acknowledged and rarely enforced. 0 9 Current fourth amendment doctrine is so muddy, and the
Court's message is so deprecatory of fourth amendment rights, that an
officer need only act reasonably in bringing contraband and criminals
into court. Courts invariably affirm the warrantless activity, receive the.
205. Uviller, supra note 73, at 30. Professor Uviller provides some telling statistics that connect the rise of the reasonableness approach with the retirement of Justice Stewart, the proponent
of the prescriptive, warrant-based fourth amendment jurisprudence.
Professor Uviller argued: "Since Stewart's retirement, the Court has excluded the evidence of
the warrantless search or seizure in only 23.7 percent of the cases it has reviewed." During the last
seven years of Justice Stewart's term, the Court excluded the evidence more than twice as often: in
51.6% of the cases presented. Id. at 38. Furthermore, warrantless searches have been found "reasonable in 70 percent of the cases since 1982, whereas in the preceding seven years only 62.5 percent passed muster." Id.
206. Justice Frankfurter stated: "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle,
precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say
that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend [our] 'sense of justice.'" Rochin,
342 U.S. at 173.
207. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965) (establishing an absolute preference for warrants).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 189-207. Recent cases like Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602,
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656, and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990), reveal that the reasonableness analysis has become so government oriented that it shifts the focus of the fourth amendment away from an individual right to some vague, ruleless evaluation of institutional concerns.
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evidence, and try the defendant.210 The inquiry has moved from a

before-the-fact assessment of objective facts, to an after-the-fact evaluation of evidence of crime. It is not surprising that courts are more
prone to find that police had reasonable grounds for suspecting crime
when the criminal and his instruments already are in the courtroom.
While exceptions to the warrant requirement originally were justified because warrant applications were a time-consuming procedure
that prevented police from responding to the immediacy of crime, this
justification no longer is valid. Technology enables a neutral and detached magistrate to review unfolding facts virtually instantaneously.
For years law enforcement officers have been authorized to obtain warrants over the telephone.2 11 Today more sophisticated technologies,
such as mobile telecopiers, video transmitters, and radio links, permit
immediate and easy communication with a judge or magistrate. " Paradoxically, however, as access to warrants has become easier, the Court
has made them less necessary to obtain.2 13
In United States v. Leon21' the Court surprisingly affirmed a
strong preference for warrants. The issue presented was whether a
search based on a warrant that is later found to be defective nonethe210. Some lower courts apparently are concerned that the Supreme Court has gone too far.
In response, these courts are resisting federal doctrine by finding greater individual protections in
their state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58 (1990) (Connecticut rejects the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170 (Del.
1990) (Delaware holds that a defendant cannot exercise a knowing waiver of right to counsel when
the state prevents retained counsel from contact with defendant, which rejects a contrary finding
of the Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J.
95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) (New Jersey rejects the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule);
Pennsylvania v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (Pennsylvania rejects the good faith exception).
See generally Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions As
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
211. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2). Recent revisions proposed by the Supreme Court to Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would permit federal magistrates and state courts to
issue a warrant for a search of property or for a person either within or outside the magistrate's
district, provided that the property or person is within the district when the warrant is sought.
The amendment is designed to make it easier for the government to obtain a warrant for persons
or property moving from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See 58 U.S.L.W. 1176 (May 15, 1990).
212. A procedure could be established easily by routing all calls to a 24-hour on-duty magistrate. Jurisdictions lacking the volume to justify a 24-hour magistrate could pool resources with
other localities.
213. See supra subparts ll(B)(4)-(5).
214. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon created an exception which provided that whenever an officer
executed a search pursuant to a warrant that later proved invalid, his good faith belief in the
warrant would preserve otherwise excludable evidence. With this protection, astute officers should
have incentive to use warrants. See generally Uchida, Bynum, Rogan, Murasky, Acting in Good
Faith:The Effects of United States v. Leon on the Police and Courts, 30 ARiz. L. REv. 467, 485
(1988). Indeed, the good faith standard has proven so hard to challenge that after Leon, the number of motions to suppress filed in warrant cases has diminished significantly and of those filed
even fewer are granted. Id. at 492-93.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:473

less may be valid because of the officer's good faith.21 In sanctioning
this good faith exception, the Court also endorsed the warrant
requirement.
Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper
searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,'" the
Court has expressed a strong preference for warrants and has declared
that "in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be
sustainable where without one it would fall." 16 While the good faith
exception drastically deflects emphasis from the elements of probable
cause, it nonetheless affirms a preference for warrants and the procedures attendant to obtaining them. Furthermore, the unstated, and perhaps unintended, corollary of Leon is that if searches with warrants are
presumptively reasonable, then warrantless searches must be presumptively unreasonable.
Although cases like Leon and Illinois v. Gates21 should have increased the use of warrants because they virtually assure issuance of a
warrant and admissibility of the fruits of a search made pursuant to a
warrant, police officers surprisingly neglect to follow the warrant procedure.2 1 8 The police thus signal their ability to function efficiently without intervention by neutral magistrates and brazenly flout the warrant
requirement. Search and seize now, because it is possible to justify and
explain later. Why heed procedural details if a sympathetic audience
will hear the case anyway?
The fourth amendment's warrant requirement is the only meaningful protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.21 The warrant requirement cannot be dispensed with; it must be revitalized.
A.

The Presumptively UnreasonableStandard

Neither the per se approach nor the reasonableness standard has
proven to be the proper measure of the warrant requirement. The per
se approach is too rigid; in defending the right of the people to be pro215. The Court stated that" 'A warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish'
that a law enforcement officer has 'acted in good faith in conducting the search.'" Leon, 468 U.S.
at 922 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982)).
216. Id. at 913-14 (citations omitted).
217. 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (discussed supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text).
218.

R. VAN DuizEND, L. SUTTON & C. CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEP-

75-92 (1985) [hereinafter NCSC STUDY]. Among the reasons
presented for police reluctance to apply for warrants is a perception by officers that because of the
rigid warrant requirements, their request will be denied if they do not follow exact procedure. Id.
at 75-85. As discussed below, if warrants are easier to obtain, this roadblock should disappear.
219. See infra subpart HI(A).
TIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES
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tected from unreasonable searches and seizures, the per se rule compromises the right of the people to have criminals arrested, prosecuted,
and convicted. Accordingly, the Court created such numerous exceptions to the per se rule that it eliminated any meaningful notion of a
per se standard.2 20 On the other hand, the reasonableness standard is

hardly very meaningful either. It is virtually immune from review and
does not prevent police intrusion. To the contrary, by inviting courts to
find productive police conduct reasonable rather than requiring courts
to suppress illegally obtained evidence of crime, the reasonableness
standard creates an incentive for police to search first and seek approval later.221 The failure of these two extremes highlights the need for
an honest application of a workable standard.
Every warrantless search should be presumptively unreasonable.
Law enforcement officers should be permitted to rebut this presumption only by the strongest showing of inability to obtain a warrant. As
stated by Justice Robert Jackson, officers acting as their own magistrate
must be able to justify a warrantless search by demonstrating "some
real immediate and serious consequences" if they had applied for a war222
rant before acting.
Unfortunately, the Court has used presumptively unreasonable language, on occasion, rather carelessly and almost interchangeably with
2
the per se test. For example, in Horton v. California
.
the Court wrote:
"[T]he 'plain view' doctrine is often considered an exception to the gen22 4
eral rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.

The Court cited Mincey v. Arizona2 2 5 for this proposition, which states:
"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process . . .are per se unreasonable. ' 22 6 Such usage is imprecise and misleading, and suggests a
220. As defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990), per se means: "By itself; in itself;
taken alone; by means of itself; through itself; inherently; in isolation; unconnected with other
matters; simply as such; in its own nature without reference to its relation." Id. at 1142.
221. Cf. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASs aD WHAT ALICE FouND THERE (1930).
Carroll wrote:
"[T]here's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial doesn't
even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all."
"Suppose he never commits the crime?" said Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen said ....
Id. at 95-96.
222. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), noted that "a search is
'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity." Id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Rabinowitz was overruled in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
223.

110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).

224. Id. at 2306.
225. 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
226. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2306 n.4; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)
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standard that does not exist.2 27

The proposed presumptive unreasonableness standard is less rigid
than the per se test because it allows the burden of proof to shift to the
government. The Court must apply the standard more rigidly than the
reasonableness test, however, to eliminate most of the present exceptions to the warrant requirement. When a warrantless search is challenged under the proposed standard, the government would have the
opportunity to present evidence of emergency or other necessity that
precluded an officer from obtaining a warrant. A judge then would determine if the evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.2 28 This determination would be made on a case-by-case

basis. Although this is essentially what happens today, it is a perversion
of the present finite per se rule.
Two critical assumptions underlie the proposed presumptively unreasonable test: (1) that the core of the fourth amendment is its requirement that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause;

'2

9

and (2) that a reasonable search is one executed with a valid warrant
except in very limited circumstances.
1. The Core of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
warrants because King George's soldiers relied on general warrants and
writs of assistance23 0 to ransack houses, papers, and effects in the name
of the King.231 These general warrants were a creature of English law,
(holding that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable"). The Court in Payton cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971), for the
proposition that "a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per
se unreasonable." Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 n.25.
227. Perhaps this unexplained change in language was intended subtly to shift the standard
much in the same way the standing requirement shifted from a reasonable to a legitimate expectation of privacy in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). It did not change the test, however,
and only furthered confusion.
228.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1185 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a presumption as "a rule of

law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of a basic fact gives rise to existence of presumed fact,
until presumption is rebutted"); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 336-349 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984).
229. US. CONST. amend. IV.
230. The writ of assistance actually resembled a general warrant. See Fraenkel, Concerning
Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. RaV. 361, 364 (1920).
231. To raise funds, colonial justices issued writs of assistance empowering customs officials
to search (and forcibly enter, if necessary) homes to seize and secure contraband. In Paxton's Case,
Quincey Mass. 7, 51 (1761), Oxenbridge Thatcher and James Otis were hired to challenge the
legality of these general warrants. Despite Otis's argument that the writs were contrary to fundamental principles of law that recognized the sanctity of the home, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court ruled that these warrants were legal. Id. at 57. See generally 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAms 106-47 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965) [hereinafter LEGAL PAPERS]. Otis's plea, however, did
inspire John Adams to write that "'[t]hen and there the child Independence was born."' LEGAL
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which were brought to the colonies with the customs officers and
soldiers sent to enforce tariffs and customs duties.,2 In Entick v. Carrington,33 however, Lord Camden held a search warrant invalid because it failed to name the specific papers sought, and no oath of
probable cause had been required.3 4 Soon thereafter, William Blackstone wrote that "a generalwarrant to apprehend all persons suspected,
without naming or particularly describing any person in special, is iegal and void for its uncertainty.

' 23 5

Nevertheless, general warrants were

still available in the colonies. The American Revolution fomented in the
shadow of these events.
After the Revolution, the states drafted individual declarations of
rights.2 6 Each declaration contained a prohibition on the use of general
warrants. 3 7 James Madison referred to the individual state declarations
when drafting the federal Bill of Rights.3 8 Thus, history shows that the
fourth amendment was a response to the abuses of general warrants
and the violations of personal liberty that they engendered.23 9
When the fourth amendment originally was approved by the House
Committee of the Whole, it contained but one clause. 40 The amendment stated:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly
24 1
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Historians claim that in an effort to strengthen the warrant language,
Representative Egbert Benson of New York amended the draft by adding a comma and the words "shall not be violated, and no warrants
PAPERS, supra, at 107 (quoting Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817)).
232. See R RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 11 (1955).
233. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
234.

Id. at 1063-73.

235.

4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMErrARIS ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND: A FAcSIMILE OF THE FIRST
1765-1769, at 288 (1979) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
236. See . RUTLAND, supra note 232, at 41-77.
237. See, e.g., Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776, reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 234 (1980). Article X of the Virginia Declaration provides:

EDITION OF

OF

That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous
and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.

Id. at 235. For reprintings of the declarations of all the original states, see the complete volumes of
THE RooTs OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS.
238. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 41 (1966).
239. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 617, 624-30 (1886).
240. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789); N. LAssON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNrrED STATES CONSTITUTION 100 n.77 (1937).
241. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 (Gales and Seaton eds. 1834) (emphasis added).
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' The significance of this change is questionable
shall issue but upon."242
because the Framers ratified the fourth amendment without debate or
discussion as part of the package of amendments that made up the Bill
of Rights. Professor Silas Wasserstrom concludes that little reason exists to support the notion that the Framers intended the fourth amendment to be interpreted literally or that such an interpretation shows
what the Framers thought about the relation between the two clauses of

the amendment.2 43 Warrantless searches, however, were almost unheard

of at the time that the document was drafted. 244 Therefore, when the
fourth amendment speaks of "unreasonable searches," it is only logical
to view this in the context of the warrant clause.245
The fourth amendment, like the whole Constitution, was designed
as a living document to grow with the government and the people that
it purports to govern."" While the nature of government intrusions may
differ today, the need for protection against them remains essential.
Modern technology provides the opportunity to invade privacy in ways
that the drafters of the Constitution probably never imagined.24 7 Electronic surveillance,248 parabolic microphones,249 beepers,2 50 com242. 5 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 237, at 1112. Perhaps it is nothing more than a drafting
oversight that the present amendment contains two clauses connected by a comma. Representative
Benson of New York chaired a committee of three appointed to arrange the amendments for final
passage. In a draft sent to the Senate, he submitted the fourth amendment as presently constructed, without noting the change. Apparently, no one else noticed the change either. This was
the exact language voted down in Benson's earlier proposal to the House, which sought to
strengthen the ban on general warrants. N. LAsSON, supra note 240, at 101.
243. Wasserstrom, The FourthAmendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRiM. L. Rav. 1389, 1391
(1989).
244. Id. at 1392, 1395.
245. When the fourth amendment was adopted, warrants were used to give law enforcement
officials authority that they otherwise would not have possessed. In contrast, the present function
of warrants is to limit the otherwise sweeping authority of today's law enforcement officers. Id. at
1395-96. At common law, warrantless searches and seizures in most circumstances could be resisted
lawfully. The function of the warrant was to outlaw resistance and immunize from civil liability
those acting under the authority of the warrant. See Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 1129-32 (1969).
246. The Framers worked in an atmosphere that encouraged transcendence. They knew the
perpetual growth of freedom: it cannot be less meaningful today or tomorrow than it was at the
birth of the nation. See generally I. BRANT, THE Bsum OF RIGHTS (1965).
247. As Justice Louis Brandeis prophesied in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928):
But "time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes." Subtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.
Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
248. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (police used an informant carrying
a microphone to record conversations about the sale of illegal drugs on eight occasions without
procuring a warrant before "wiring" the informant).
249. See, e.g., Clark v. Township Falls, 890 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1989).
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puters, 51 telephone pen registers,252 urinalysis,5 3 and even DNA
testing,2 5" are only some of the techniques employed by the government. These more sophisticated means of searching for evidence require
greater protection from the overreaching arm of the government than
ever before. The warrant requirement of the fourth amendment can and
should provide this protection.2 5
2. A Reasonable Search Is Only One Conducted Pursuant to a Valid
Warrant, Except in Certain Limited Circumstances
When Justice Potter Stewart was on the Court, he asserted the position that reasonable searches require valid warrants with few exceptions, and he generally was able to get a majority of the Justices to
support him.256 In 1974 Professor Anthony Amsterdam noted that the
Supreme Court consistently has followed the "one governing principle"
of the fourth amendment that a search always requires a search warrant,15 7 except in "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. "' 58
Chief Justice
Rehnquist,
however,
interprets
reasonableness as separate from the warrant requirement, and his view
predominates the present majority.2 5 9 This view denies the essence of

the fourth amendment protections.
When a warrant is sought, a magistrate must measure its issuance
250. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
251. See generally Miller, PersonalPrivacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1129-40 (1969).
252. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that the use of a pen register
on an individual's telephone is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment).
253. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
254. See, e.g., New York v. Bailey, 156 A.D.2d 846; 549 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1989).
255. See generally Van Patten, The PartisanBattle over the Constitution: Meese's Jurisprudence of OriginalIntention and Brennan's Theory of ContemporaryRatification70 MARQ.L.
REV. 389, 402-04, 416-17 (1987); Note, In Defense of the Framer'sIntent: Civic Virtue, The Bill of
Rights, and the Framers Science of Politics, 75 VA. L. REV. 1311 (1989).
256. See Uviller, supra note 73, at 33-34; cf. supra note 205.
257. Amsterdam, supra note 60, at 374.
258. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); see also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

259. Today's Court espouses two viewpoints on how searches and seizures should be judged.
The "conservative" members of the Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, are more willing to find
warrantless searches and seizures reasonable in favor of promoting governmental and societal interests. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.). Sitz
held fixed sobriety checkpoints constitutional. Although the Court concluded that the checkpoint
was a fourth amendment seizure without a warrant, the Court permitted the stop because it effectively advanced the state's interest in preventing drunk driving. Id. at 2488.
The more liberal Justices, represented by Justice Marshall, maintain that all warrantless
searches and seizures, absent exigent circumstances or consent, are unreasonable. See id. at 248890 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan,
J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
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against the standard of probable cause.2 60 A warrantless search, how-

ever, is measured only against an enigmatic reasonableness standard after the intrusion occurs.261 As Justice Brennan insists, the orderly
procedure attendant to proper, narrow warrants, reviewed and issued
by a neutral magistrate, is "[t]he cornerstone of this society, indeed of
any free society. 2 62 Moreover, our constitutional heritage demands this
procedural right.26 3 Thus, a prior determination of probable cause and

adherence to the requisite procedures protect principles of government
and individual freedoms in a way that a post hoc reasonableness test
simply cannot.
Consistent with the genius of checks and balances of our constitutional democracy, the warrant requirement places the judiciary between
the executive branch and the people. The police are an arm of the executive branch. Before the executive can invade the protected privacy
rights of the people, it must get authority from a judicial officer. It is
this judicial intercession in executive actions that provides security
against unconstitutional intrusions. The probable cause requirement
and reasonableness clauses also protect against unconstitutional intrusions. These provisions, however, only provide the measure by which
intrusions are judged. The warrant requirement alone grants a procedural right and places another branch of government between the executive and the people.
The additional step of procuring a warrant before searching or seizing a person, place, or thing is neither outdated nor unnecessary.
260. Even a watered-down Gates probable cause standard requires evaluation of all the circumstances before the search, as opposed to after-the-fact totality of circumstances review. See
supra notes 209-19 and accompanying text.
261. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson explained the
warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not
that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competi.rive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14.
262. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 578 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
263. Justice Brennan wrote:
The Constitution as originally adopted, was therefore, in great measure, a procedural document. For the same reasons the drafters of the Bill of Rights largely placed their faith in
procedural limitations on government action. The Fourth Amendment's requirement that
searches and seizures be reasonable enforces this fundamental understanding in erecting its
buffer against the arbitrary treatment of citizens by government. But to permit. . . police
discretion to supplant the objectivity of reason and, thereby, expediency to reign in the place
of order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safeguards and threaten erosion of the cornerstone of our system of government, for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us, "[t]he history
of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure."
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945)).
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Rather, it is a strong symbol of limited government, a valuable check on
unbridled police discretion, and an important protector of the right of
the people to individual privacy.
B.

The Presumptively Unreasonable Test Applied

If a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence based on a warrantless search, the presumptively unreasonable test requires that the
court grant the motion unless the government can rebut the presumption. Otherwise, the exclusionary rule demands that the court suppress
the fruits of the warrantless search.
Presently, numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist.
These exceptions include: searches incident to a valid arrest, 26 ' consent,265 the automobile exception,26 6 the inventory exception, 2 7 the

plain view exception,6 the border search exception,6 9 the administrative exception, 70 the regulated industries exception, 7 1 the stop-andfrisk exception, 72 the inevitable discovery exception, -3 the independent source exception, 7 ' the special needs exception, 75 the good faith
exception,2 7 6 and a catch-all serious crime exception.2 77 The presump-

tively unreasonable standard eliminates most of these categorical exceptions. Only a true exigent circumstance could overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness of a warrantless search.27 8 Exigent cir-

cumstance is defined as a situation of real, immediate, and serious con264. See, e.g.,
752 (1969).
265. See, e.g.,
U.S. 218 (1973).
266. See, e.g.,
267. See, e.g.,

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640

(1983).
268.

See, e.g., Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

U.S. 443 (1971).
269.

See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).

270. See,
271. See,
272. See,
273. See,
274. See,
275.

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).

See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).

276. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
277.

See Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusion-

ary Rule, 86 MxcH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1987) (discussing how the Supreme Court may tend to create
more exceptions to the exclusionary rule to allow evidence in cases dealing with "serious crimes,"
such as drug offenses, into the courts).
278. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (defining exigent circumstances); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948) (stating that "[w]hen an officer undertakes to act as
his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate
and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant").
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sequence that is not created by law enforcement.2 7 9

For example, an officer hotly pursuing a fleeing felon could enter a
residence to arrest the suspect.2 80 While inside the residence, the officer

also could conduct a cursory search of areas within the immediate control of the suspect to secure the area and the officer's safety.28 1 As in
Michigan v. Tyler,282 an officer likewise could enter a burning building
without a warrant and conduct a cursory search for persons or evidence
of crime. 288 A search of the premises incident to arrest, however, such as
the protective sweep authorized in Maryland v. Buie,2 would not rebut the presumption because the police created the exigency. In Buie
the defendant was in custody outside his house when an officer decided
to enter the basement. 285 Although the police stated that they thought

that an accomplice could be on the premises, no evidence supported
this hunch.288 The police had more than adequate time to return to the
squad car and call in for a warrant to search the premises more thoroughly for either an accomplice or evidence while still keeping watch
over the premises.
The presumptively unreasonable test is premised on an honest application of a simple standard-true exigency. To preserve its meaning
it is necessary to abolish the presently accepted exceptions that bear
little relation either to exigent circumstances or impracticability, which
in most cases was their original justification. While new situations will
arise to challenge the test, some current exceptions can be discussed
with certainty. Consent, the automobile exception, inventory, special
needs, inevitable discovery, independent source, and good faith exceptions all can be eliminated. Some remaining exceptions, such as the
stop-and-frisk, administrative, 287 and plain view exceptions, need not
be eliminated. They should be narrowed significantly, however, to allow
warrantless searches only in situations with the most minimal potential
279. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50; McDonald, 335 U.S. at 451-60 (Jackson, J., concurring).
280. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The government, however, would bear
the burden of persuading the Court why it was necessary to search inside containers pursuant to
this exigency. Thus, the washing machine and toilet tank searches that were upheld in Warden
automatically would not be permitted. See id.
281. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Unlike Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct.
1093 (1990), however, the officer could not conduct a protective sweep unless he observed more
than one person fleeing into the residence.
282. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
283. If the officer had information that the building was going to be set afire, however, the
officer could not wait until it was burning or charred to conduct a warrantless search.
284. 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
285. Id. at 1100 (Stevens, J. concurring).
286. Id. This suspicion actually turned out to be incorrect.
287. These are hybrids of the original exceptions.
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for abuse and unnecessary intrusion. 8s
For example, except for routine customs searches at international
borders,28 9 the Court should eliminate the consent exception totally.
Presently, a finding of voluntary consent is sufficient to legalize almost
any kind of search.29 0 Accordingly, police find consent an attractive alternative to the warrant procedures. Consent, however, must fail an
honest application test because it offers too much room for subtle or
overt coercion for it to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness.
The routine traffic stop provides a useful example. Assume that pursuant to a traffic stop, an officer asks for a license and registration. If the
officer suspects anything, a common practice is to ask for consent to
search the vehicle.291 A driver who has just been pulled over, however,
288. For example, the administrative warrant based upon less than probable cause issued to
search for code violations falls within the rules proposed here. The noncriminal nature of the
search and the inability to state particularly the locus of the search justify proceeding with an
administrative warrant. The expansion of the Camaraprinciple, however, must be curbed. There is
no justification for the warrantless search of dangerous or highly regulated premises. Even in a
dangerous industry such as mining, sufficient time exists to get a warrant unless police arrive immediately following an explosion or fire. The degree of industry regulation is insufficient to rebut a
presumption of unreasonableness. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), showed how lax that
classification became when the Court determined that a junkyard in New York was a "closely
regulated" industry. Id. at 703-05 & n.14. There is no exigency or voluntary consent to warrantless
searches in most regulated industries, and thus, they cannot be exempted from the warrant
requirement.
The plain view exception also falls within the rule, but may need some tailoring. If police are
legitimately on the premises, there is no need to eliminate the plain view exception. This type of
seizure is in accord with the presumptively unreasonable warrant standard because the initial intrusion is valid only if preceded by a warrant, voluntary consent, or a true exigent circumstance. If,
however, the initial intrusion is a ruse to obtain evidence, fruits, or contraband, the seizure must
fail. Although the Supreme Court recently found that inadvertence is not a prerequisite for a valid
plain view search, see Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990), that finding is inapposite to the
standard proposed by this Article. If law enforcement has reason to believe that a residence, office,
or vehicle contains something subject to seizure, they must obtain a warrant before entering the
premises.
289. When a person crosses the United States border through a routine customs station, she
is put on notice that her person and possessions are subject to being searched. Thus, she implicitly
consents to the intrusion. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). This consent is subject to
none of the overt or subtle coercion inherent in other situations. Furthermore, questions about
actual or apparent authority to consent do not arise in these circumstances. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The justifications for the border exception remain valid under
the presumptively unreasonable test. Roving patrols, however, do not possess the same elements of
voluntary consent and, therefore, only can be valid subject to a warrant.
290. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
291. This scenario is taken from a series of actual stops that took place on a small portion of
Interstate 95 in Delaware. See infra note 293. One particularly vigilant patrol officer, Officer
Durnan, stopped cars traveling north on 1-95 according to a pattern. Although he would testify
that he "knew nothing of a drug courier profile," the cars that he pulled over for "traffic violations" invariably had out of state license plates and were driven by Hispanics. He routinely testified that the drivers "appeared nervous," arousing his suspicion that they may be carrying
contraband. Duran would ask the drivers to exit the car and sit in the patrol car. The facts at this
point are in dispute. Durnan has testified that he asked for consent to search the vehicle. The
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often is nervous and upset, and depending on the locus of the stop, is
totally at the mercy of the officer.292 Moreover, regardless of whether
the driver actually consented, an officer conducting a warrantless search
pursuant to a traffic stop may justify his actions by claiming that the
driver consented. 298 Thus, the officer's word often is pitted against the

defendant's, leaving courts and litigants with an uneasy feeling about
the actual facts.
A consent exception simply is not needed. If circumstances truly
are exigent, officers may conduct a warrantless search. Otherwise, if police feel a pressing need to search a person, home, vehicle, or container,
they can obtain a warrant rapidly by using one of the expedited warrant
procedures such as the radio or telefax warrant.
Similarly, the automobile exception, as we know it, must be eliminated. e4 Only when a vehicle search fits within the definition of exigent
circumstance will it meet the presumptively unreasonable test. At the
time the Court decided Carroll v. United States,2

5

the need for officers

to proceed expeditiously because of the car's inherent mobility was a
valid justification for a warrantless search.29 6 Labeling Carroll an "automobile exception," however, was an unfortunate misnomer that fostered
some of the ridiculous results seen in modern cases such as Chambers v.
Maroney 97 and California v. Carney.298 Quite simply, Carroll was an
defendants, on the other hand, have testified that Durnan told them that he was giving them a
ticket and requested that they sign the bottom. They testified further that they were unaware they
were signing a consent form. Signed consent forms invariably were introduced into evidence at the
suppression motions.
All these cases pitted defendants' word against that of Officer Durnan's. The warrantless
searches consistently were approved based on consent. See infra note 293.
292. Although Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), holds that a person need not
know of her right to refuse consent for that consent to be valid, certainly a person must feel that
she has the option to refuse.
293. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that a police
officer received permission to search after testifying that pursuant to a traffic stop, he asked the
driver to sit in the patrol car and asked if there was any contraband in the car), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1321 (1990); United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that pursuant to
a traffic stop, a police officer asked the driver to sit in his patrol car where he asked the driver if
there were guns, fireworks, or untaxed cigarettes in the car, and the driver's negative reply authorized full search of car); United States v. Ospina, 679 F. Supp. 402 (D. Del. 1988) (finding that
pursuant to a traffic stop, an officer seated the driver in his patrol car and inquired if the driver
had any weapons, untaxed cigarettes, or fireworks in the car, and the officer stated to the court
that he deliberately omitted drugs from his question because it would have been harder to get
consent).
294. Currently there are two justifications for the automobile exception: (1) the fleeting nature of the vehicle, and (2) a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle that is subject to regulation
and exposed to the public. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806, 811 (1982).
295. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
296. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
297. 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (holding that an impounded vehicle could be searched without a
warrant because it could have been searched earlier out on the road).
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exigent circumstances case.
Today, the radio or telefax warrant procedure allows officers to act
without delay during a vehicle stop when they have probable cause to
suspect that a vehicle contains contraband. Police can obtain a warrant
almost immediately by a simple radio call to a magistrate designated to
review probable cause for radio warrant applications. Vehicles even
could be equipped with telefax machines, permitting written documentation of the warrant application and an actual warrant for police to
present to a subject prior to conducting a search. Once the exigency is
eliminated from the situation, no justification exists for proceeding
without a warrant. If the exigency cannot be eliminated, then the officer
may proceed without a warrant, and the government should be able to
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.
The Court also should eliminate the inventory exception. Inventory
searches present no exigency. Moreover, it is easy to obtain a warrant
based on the same justifications of protection of property and insurance
for police against civil liability that prompted the development of this
exception. A special warrant similar to the administrative warrant approved in Camara v. Municipal Court"9 should be issued. While adherence to written procedures governing inventories somewhat limits the
inventory exception, some jurisdictions today still have no formal procedures.300 Thus, it is preferable to adhere to the new rule and proceed
formally. This approach will protect police departments and eliminate
future cases such as Florida v. Wells in which the Court suppressed
evidence1 because a police department did not have a standardized
30
policy.
Additionally, the Court must eliminate the special needs exception
discussed in the employment search cases. 3 0 2 Although the employment

context may present special needs that are more demanding than those
of normal law enforcement,303 the mandate of the warrant clause still
applies if a public employer is conducting a search of an individual's
possessions or person. The employment context, perhaps even more so
than many other circumstances, presents few of the exigencies that preclude a warrant application. An ongoing investigation or some suspi298. 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (holding that police validly searched a parked mobile home without
a warrant because automobiles are mobile and there is a lesser expectation of privacy in them).
299. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).
301. Id. (holding that the opening of a closed container found in a vehicle inventory search
violates the fourth amendment if the police department lacked any standardized inventory policy).
302. For a more complete discussion of the fallacy of the special needs exceptions, see supra
subpart Hl(B)(5)(b). See also Bookspan, Jar Wars: Employee Drug Testing, The Constitution,and
the American Drug Problem, 26 Am.CRim. L. Rav. 359 (1988).
303. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
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cious employee activity usually precedes workplace searches. Except in
the rare instance in which an employee presents an immediate danger
to himself or others, there is no reason to proceed without a warrant.
3 04 for example,
In O'Connor v. Ortega,
administrators suspected
Dr. Ortega for some time before proceeding to search his office. °5 Ample opportunity existed for them to obtain a warrant. Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab0 6 the Customs Service
knew well in advance which employees met its testing protocol.3 0 7 No
reason existed for proceeding without a warrant. Employees do not consent automatically to invasions of privacy simply by accepting employment with a public employer. Thus, absent exigency, the special needs
exception fails the presumptively unreasonable standard.
Inevitable discovery also must be eliminated under the new test. If
law enforcement fails to follow the warrant procedures, the Court must
not allow them to benefit from the possibility or even probability that
they would have found the evidence, articles, or information regardless
of the search's illegality.3 08 This exception just invites post hoc determinations of what would have happened and fails to penalize precisely the
behavior that should be avoided.
Finally, the Court must eliminate the good faith doctrine if the new
test is to have any viability or impact. Although, as mentioned earlier,
the Leon decision should encourage the use of warrants, no such incentive is needed under the presumptively unreasonable test. A good faith
exception only undermines the honest application rule of the new test.
Moreover, the good faith exception essentially reduces the probable
cause requirement to a reasonableness test.3 09 If the presumptively un304. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
305. Id. at 712.
306. 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (indicating that the commissioner knew which employees were eligible for promotion).
307. See id. at 660.
308. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
309. Justice White stated:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence
obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement
officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542
(1974)).
At least one commentator contends that the high "costs of the warrant process," in the form
of lost police time, are themselves sufficient to ensure that the police have probable cause. See
Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986). Thus, if these costs are maintained, the good
faith exception "will have no bite." Taking this to the extreme, Professor Donald Dripps posits
that the warrant application can be considered as evidence of probable cause. Id.; accord NCSC
STUDY, supra note 218, at 81-82. The problem with his thesis is that it encourages lengthy, timeintensive warrant applications. This rigid procedure, however, discourages most officers from ap-
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reasonable standard were nothing more than a reasonableness test, then
the stringent emphasis on warrants in all cases except valid exigency
would not be necessary.
The purpose of the presumptively unreasonable standard is to revive the probable cause and particularity protections articulated in the
fourth amendment. Judicial approval of searches must occur before, not
after, the intrusion if the fourth amendment is to have any meaning.
While the good faith exception endorses the presearch warrant procedures ° by emphasizing whether an officer went to a magistrate, it is
unacceptable under the proposed rule because it dilutes the presearch
review. To effect any significant change, the Court must strictly adhere
to the presumptively unreasonable standard and not allow loopholes
that circumvent the rule.
The presumptively unreasonable test is premised strongly on warrants being physically easier to obtain. Consequently, some of the formal procedures attendant to the warrant process are streamlined. It is
most essential, however, that the probable cause determination remain
foremost in the minds of the magistrate and the policer officer. Additionally, to the extent that Illinois v. Gates"'1 has eased the probable
cause standard to a fair probability test, further eroding the test by
sanctioning questionable or wrong determinations of probable cause is
unnecessary. The emphasis is on warrants issued upon probable cause,
not searches executed in good faith.
C. Benefits of the Presumptively Unreasonable Standard
Courts need to state fourth amendment requirements more simply
and clearly, and they must establish more effective lines of communication to police.3 12 Because the Court previously has chosen fact-style de-

cision making,"1 " it has failed abysmally to establish reliable,
plying for warrants at all. Professor Steven Duke made a thoughtful response to Professor Dripps's
article. See Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986).
310. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
311. 462 U.S. 213 (1983); see also Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990) (holding that

Terry requires a lesser showing of probable cause than Gates).
312.

The NCSC Study concludes that although police officers receive some formal training in

search and seizure law and the procedures for obtaining a search warrant, "such training was generally viewed-by police as well as other officials involved in the warrant process-as extremely
limited and of little practical use." NCSC STUDY, supra note 218, at 87-88. Officers generally have
indicated that the best kind of training they received about the fourth amendment was "'on the
job,' as they rode and worked with more experienced officers, tried their own hand at drafting an
affidavit, and otherwise 'learned the ropes.'" Id. at 88.
313. See Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of
Lawyering, 48 IND. LJ. 329, 334 (1973) (taking facts and attempting to fit them into "legal molds
broad enough'to permit free form decision making, but narrow enough to prevent the most extreme outrages").
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substantive fourth amendment law. Naturally, this confusion trickles
down to the states that are bound by the federal exclusionary rule and
to the police who are directed to obey the fourth amendment.
The case-by-case approach to fourth amendment law does not resolve successfully the types of constitutional questions raised by the
cases. Rather than pursue a reasonableness litmus test for fourth
amendment questions, which appears to be the Court's present predilection, the Court must provide definitional clarity. A reasonableness
analysis only muddies already dark waters, essentially pronouncing that
"it is reasonable if a judge thinks that it is reasonable." This does nothing to further substantive doctrine.
The presumptively unreasonable standard establishes an unquestionable preference for warrants in all searches but truly exigent circumstances. It creates a bright line for police to follow, offering clear
direction and easy application.314 The penalty for proceeding without a
warrant is firm and certain. Thus, the rule encourages police to obtain
warrants whenever possible. This, in turn, encourages police to abide by
constitutional law.5 15 Similarly, the rule will influence prosecutors to direct police behavior toward obedience to the fourth amendment.
The rule also encourages more careful judicial intervention in the
early stages of an investigation. A presearch determination of probable
cause requires attention to the totality of the circumstances, and the
314. A preference for clear direction and bright lines is evident in other situations. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), for example, the Court created a simple four-part incantation for police to recite before questioning a suspect in custody. After the decision was rendered,
police and prosecutors complained incessantly that this was too great a burden on police. See
Agronsky, Meese v. Miranda: The Final Countdown, 73 A.BA. J. 86 (1987); Ervin, Miranda v.
Arizona: A Decision Based on Excessive and Visionary Solicitude for the Accused, 86 Am. CRiM.
L.Q. 125 (1966). Police departments, however, quickly rose to the occasion and printed "rights
cards" that conveniently could be carried in an officer's uniform pocket. The cards became so
popular that today probably all law enforcement agencies use rights cards of some form. In fact,
many cards now have a place for the defendant to sign indicating that he was read his rights,
understood them, and chose to waive them. A signed waiver card makes the prosecution's burden
of proving voluntary waiver much lighter.
Today, most law enforcement personnel readily admit that they prefer the Miranda rules to
the previous requirements. See Jacoby, Fighting Crime by the Rules: Why Cops Like Miranda,
NEWSWEEK, July 18, 1988, at 53. Although members of the Justice Department may wish to abolish
Miranda,see, e.g., Report to the Attorney Generalon the Law of PretrialInterrogation,Feb. 12,
1986, reprinted in 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989), police are not among those clamoring to overrule the decision.
315. As Professor Ronald Dworkin states:
Those who see the exclusionary rule as representing the wrong choice in the battle between
criminals and the police misconceive the basic issue. The choice is not between criminals on
the one hand and police on the other, but rather between two different kinds of lawbreakers.
Why the lawbreaking police should prevail in a choice between evils is not at all clear. Indeed,
in terms of societal danger a police officer who violates constitutional rights poses a greater
threat than almost any "criminal" imaginable.
Dworkin, supra note 313, at 330.

1991]

REWORKING THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

529

postsearch bounty does not color that determination. Even under a fair
probability standard, a magistrate bears the weight of evaluating seriously whether an intrusion is appropriate.
Through their objectivity, magistrates and judges are able to see in
ways that police officers cannot. Thus, they are likely to have differing
assumptions about who is likely to have committed a crime and when
intervention and intrusions are necessary. Because of their different socioeconomic backgrounds, the social contexts, biases, and prejudices of
magistrates and judges will differ from those of the on-the-street officer. 1 When magistrates respect their role, their second opinion is not
just a formality or rubber stamp. 17 Furthermore, early judicial intervention reduces judicial burdens later on in the system. Eliminating the
case-by-case reasonableness determinations that are necessary under
the present system reduces case load at the motions and appellate
levels, freeing judges to handle other matters on crowded dockets.
Finally, the rule emphasizes substance as well as procedure in
fourth amendment matters. It recognizes the language, intent, and transcendence of the Framers of the Constitution. It does not demand that
the Framers rule our constitutional jurisprudence from the grave, but
rather that we respect the continued integral importance of warrants to
the protections inherent in the fourth amendment. It counterattacks
the passions of the moment-as reflected in the reasonableness analysis-and reflects more deeply held moral principles about the integrity
of persons, the value of privacy, and the foundation of our government.
The rule revitalizes the fourth amendment, rescuing it from the due
process test it has become.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article presumes a preference for procedural process, a clear
standard, and honest application of that standard. It condemns the enigmatic post hoc reasonableness evaluation currently in favor. Thus, the
Article focuses on abandoning dishonest application of the per se unrea316. But see Uviller, supra note 73, at 36 n.21 (asserting that police officers are raised in the
same cultural traditions as state judges).
317. In Leon the Supreme Court concluded that no evidence exists to suggest that judges
and magistrates "are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment." 468 U.S. at 916.
Others differ on this point. See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1 (1978); Schroeder,
Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEo. L.J.
1361, 1412 (1981). While it is still debatable whether magistrates become "rubber stamps" for
police, there clearly is great variance among magistrates, which inevitably leads to magistrate
shopping. NCSC STUDY, supra note 218, at 80-81. The proposed rules eliminate magistrate shopping to some extent by reducing in-person police appearances before magistrates and subjecting
the oral or written affidavits to whomever is the on-duty telephone-telefax magistrate. To the extent that determinations of probable cause vary, higher courts will provide guidance.
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sonable test and creating and enforcing a new standard against which to
measure warrantless searches.
The Court should hold warrantless searches presumptively unreasonable and eliminate all exceptions to the warrant requirement except
exigent circumstances. Accordingly, police should be able to obtain warrants more easily. When police nonetheless proceed without a warrant,
the government would have the opportunity to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness if the facts permit.
The test recognizes the importance of attention to procedure and
endorses the warrant requirement as the only means for protecting the
rights inherent in the fourth amendment. A presumptively unreasonable standard would promote the Court's own preference for bright line
tests and eliminate much of the confusion in modern fourth amendment jurisprudence. It also would reestablish incentives for police to
renew the practice of applying for warrants. Moreover, if the Court
strictly follows the proposed standard it would reduce fourth amendment litigation by eliminating the need for case-by-case determinations
of reasonable behavior, give form back to the content of the warrant
clause, and breathe new life into the fourth amendment.

